JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Control<br />
(3) Provide a flexible ACP that can adapt to changing requirements of the tactical<br />
situation.<br />
Refer to <strong>JP</strong> 3-52, Joint <strong>Air</strong>space Control, for more details concerning the ACA.<br />
10. Cross Area of Responsibility Comm<strong>and</strong> Relationships Considerations<br />
The primary strategic planning documents, Guidance for Employment of the Force <strong>and</strong><br />
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, discuss “cross-AOR” in campaign planning. GCCs are<br />
supported comm<strong>and</strong>ers for assigned missions in their AORs, <strong>and</strong> they anticipate the<br />
possibility for “cross-AOR” operations based on threats <strong>and</strong> capabilities. They must plan<br />
accordingly <strong>and</strong> coordinate with other affected <strong>and</strong> supporting CCDRs.<br />
a. A significant concern for GCCs is not only long-range BMs that can traverse entire<br />
AORs, but also SRBMs, MRBMs, <strong>and</strong> IRBMs, because they represent the most prevalent<br />
threats.<br />
b. When establishing comm<strong>and</strong> relationships <strong>and</strong> C2 for cross-AOR BMD, the<br />
following should be considered:<br />
(1) Span of Control. Span of control is based on factors such as the number of<br />
subordinates/components, number of activities, range of weapon systems, force capabilities,<br />
the size <strong>and</strong> complexity of the operational area, <strong>and</strong> the method used to control operations<br />
(e.g., centralized or decentralized execution). Coordination authority between GCCs<br />
should enable coordination at component <strong>and</strong> tactical levels supporting unity of effort<br />
for cross-AOR BMD.<br />
(2) Simplicity. Simplicity is achieved through an unambiguous chain of comm<strong>and</strong>,<br />
well-defined comm<strong>and</strong> relationships, <strong>and</strong> clear delineation of responsibilities <strong>and</strong> authorities.<br />
For cross-AOR BMD, which typically must be executed in a manner of minutes, simplicity<br />
is essential <strong>and</strong> enables fully planned <strong>and</strong> rehearsed actions before execution is actually<br />
required.<br />
(3) Unit Integrity. Component forces should remain organized as designed <strong>and</strong> in<br />
the manner accustomed through training, but cross-AOR operations may necessitate unique<br />
support relationships, including units supporting forces in other theaters.<br />
(4) Interoperability. C2 capabilities should be interoperable within the joint<br />
force headquarters, among component comm<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> other supporting comm<strong>and</strong>s, <strong>and</strong><br />
between joint forces in support relationships. Collaborative planning at various levels is<br />
an essential aspect of interoperability among joint force components <strong>and</strong><br />
supported/supporting comm<strong>and</strong>s.<br />
c. Authorities <strong>and</strong> Battle Management. Short missile engagement windows place a<br />
premium on clearly established authorities. For example, in AORs without active conflicts<br />
involving air or missile threats, the GCC may only approve the theater JFACC/AADC for<br />
engagement authority of inbound threats within friendly airspace. In an operational area<br />
with imminent or ongoing hostilities, the JFC may approve delegation of engagement<br />
II-15