JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Chapter V
(5) Firing Doctrine. Guidance should also be provided for inventory management
to include threshold levels and modified procedures once those threshold levels are crossed.
Factors include:
(a) Determining the single shot P k for own force interceptors against threat
missile types in the enemy missile order of battle.
(b) Formulating the number of upper-and-lower tier interceptors required to
achieve the designated levels of protection.
(c) Equating threat BM impact point prediction with the designated level of
protection for the threatened asset.
(d) Establishing a firing policy (e.g., first interceptor to be able to intercept the
threat MB being the first interceptor battery to engage and the next system being designated
to cover the engagement should the initial system miss).
(e) Firing lower-tier missiles in the last engagement window and factoring in
their cumulative P k in determining the number of upper-tier interceptors to fire in the final
salvo.
c. Active Missile Defense Design. Based on an expected air and BM threat, the
challenge for the AADC will be to balance competing air (including CMs) and BM
(including short, -medium, -and long-range) defense demands. This could result in an
economy of force issue: use land-and sea-based SAMs that are capable of both active BM
and AD only for missile defense, while using purely AD assets for defending against the
enemy air threat. For example, against a formidable BM threat that could not be eliminated
by OCA operations, the AADC may use SAMs only against BMs, not against air threats, and
increase reliance on fighter escorts and CAPs in a layered defense against air threats. A
significant missile threat will have great impact on the AADP (i.e., the DAL, placement of
WEZs, and types of defensive coverages). Flexibility will be required as there may not be
enough resources to defend all assets.
9. General
SECTION B. DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS
The AADC develops the AADP in coordination with the joint force components,
integrating DCA operations throughout the theater/JOA (see Figure V-1). The AADP
reflects the JFC’s objectives, priorities, and the specific need for air superiority and
protection, and the appropriate component commanders provide the surface-, air-, and seabased
forces/capabilities for those DCA operations required to execute that plan.
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