JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Executive Summary<br />
Cross Area of<br />
Responsibility Comm<strong>and</strong><br />
Relationships<br />
Considerations<br />
Multinational<br />
Considerations<br />
Multinational Comm<strong>and</strong><br />
Relationships<br />
Multinational<br />
Organization<br />
Comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Control<br />
Systems <strong>and</strong> Functions<br />
GCCs are supported comm<strong>and</strong>ers for assigned missions in<br />
their AORs, <strong>and</strong> they anticipate the possibility for “cross-<br />
AOR” operations based on threats <strong>and</strong> capabilities.<br />
Coordination authority between GCCs should enable<br />
coordination at component <strong>and</strong> tactical levels<br />
supporting unity of effort for cross-AOR ballistic<br />
missile defense (BMD).<br />
Most joint operations are now conducted within a<br />
multinational context (i.e., an alliance or coalition). The<br />
JFC (who may be the multinational force comm<strong>and</strong>er) must<br />
evaluate key considerations <strong>and</strong> differences involved in<br />
planning, coordinating, <strong>and</strong> conducting counterair<br />
operations in a multinational environment.<br />
In multinational force (MNF) operations, underst<strong>and</strong>ing the<br />
agreed upon comm<strong>and</strong> relationships <strong>and</strong> the related<br />
comm<strong>and</strong> authorities is key to developing the desired unity<br />
of effort for counterair operations. The JFACC/AADC<br />
may expect no more than tactical control over MNF<br />
counterair units/capabilities, <strong>and</strong> very likely, may have<br />
simple support relationships based on mission-type orders.<br />
Each nation normally establishes a national center or cell as<br />
a focal point to ensure effective support <strong>and</strong> control of its<br />
forces, to include counterair forces. Because sharing<br />
intelligence <strong>and</strong> warning information is vital to unity of<br />
effort, any issues related to the release of intelligence<br />
information <strong>and</strong> products to MNF partners must be<br />
resolved early during planning. Before assigning tasks to<br />
MNF units, the JFACC/AADC should ensure that all<br />
elements can make meaningful contributions to the overall<br />
counterair mission. The AADC should ensure that MNF<br />
rules of engagement (ROE), engagement authorities, <strong>and</strong><br />
procedures are consistent with the combined AADP <strong>and</strong> the<br />
MNF ability to identify friendly forces, in order to prevent<br />
gaps <strong>and</strong> ensure joint air forces are not subject to an<br />
increased risk of fratricide <strong>and</strong> MNF are not restricted from<br />
self-defense.<br />
Joint counterair operations require reliable C2 capabilities<br />
that allow the JFC/JFACC/AADC, component<br />
comm<strong>and</strong>ers, <strong>and</strong> subordinate forces to integrate <strong>and</strong><br />
synchronize/deconflict OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA operations. C2<br />
systems must support OCA operations while at the same<br />
time detecting, identifying, <strong>and</strong> tracking threats in order to<br />
warn, cue, <strong>and</strong> coordinate DCA assets, including providing<br />
xiv <strong>JP</strong> 3-<strong>01</strong>