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JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

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Executive Summary<br />

Cross Area of<br />

Responsibility Comm<strong>and</strong><br />

Relationships<br />

Considerations<br />

Multinational<br />

Considerations<br />

Multinational Comm<strong>and</strong><br />

Relationships<br />

Multinational<br />

Organization<br />

Comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Control<br />

Systems <strong>and</strong> Functions<br />

GCCs are supported comm<strong>and</strong>ers for assigned missions in<br />

their AORs, <strong>and</strong> they anticipate the possibility for “cross-<br />

AOR” operations based on threats <strong>and</strong> capabilities.<br />

Coordination authority between GCCs should enable<br />

coordination at component <strong>and</strong> tactical levels<br />

supporting unity of effort for cross-AOR ballistic<br />

missile defense (BMD).<br />

Most joint operations are now conducted within a<br />

multinational context (i.e., an alliance or coalition). The<br />

JFC (who may be the multinational force comm<strong>and</strong>er) must<br />

evaluate key considerations <strong>and</strong> differences involved in<br />

planning, coordinating, <strong>and</strong> conducting counterair<br />

operations in a multinational environment.<br />

In multinational force (MNF) operations, underst<strong>and</strong>ing the<br />

agreed upon comm<strong>and</strong> relationships <strong>and</strong> the related<br />

comm<strong>and</strong> authorities is key to developing the desired unity<br />

of effort for counterair operations. The JFACC/AADC<br />

may expect no more than tactical control over MNF<br />

counterair units/capabilities, <strong>and</strong> very likely, may have<br />

simple support relationships based on mission-type orders.<br />

Each nation normally establishes a national center or cell as<br />

a focal point to ensure effective support <strong>and</strong> control of its<br />

forces, to include counterair forces. Because sharing<br />

intelligence <strong>and</strong> warning information is vital to unity of<br />

effort, any issues related to the release of intelligence<br />

information <strong>and</strong> products to MNF partners must be<br />

resolved early during planning. Before assigning tasks to<br />

MNF units, the JFACC/AADC should ensure that all<br />

elements can make meaningful contributions to the overall<br />

counterair mission. The AADC should ensure that MNF<br />

rules of engagement (ROE), engagement authorities, <strong>and</strong><br />

procedures are consistent with the combined AADP <strong>and</strong> the<br />

MNF ability to identify friendly forces, in order to prevent<br />

gaps <strong>and</strong> ensure joint air forces are not subject to an<br />

increased risk of fratricide <strong>and</strong> MNF are not restricted from<br />

self-defense.<br />

Joint counterair operations require reliable C2 capabilities<br />

that allow the JFC/JFACC/AADC, component<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>ers, <strong>and</strong> subordinate forces to integrate <strong>and</strong><br />

synchronize/deconflict OCA <strong>and</strong> DCA operations. C2<br />

systems must support OCA operations while at the same<br />

time detecting, identifying, <strong>and</strong> tracking threats in order to<br />

warn, cue, <strong>and</strong> coordinate DCA assets, including providing<br />

xiv <strong>JP</strong> 3-<strong>01</strong>

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