JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

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Executive Summary weapons resources and other military options. For counterair, CID should be accomplished with near real time (NRT) or better exchange of information between airspace control/air defense units and airspace users to meet the time and accuracy demands of combat operations. Methods of ID ID, Commitment, and Engagement Authorities The authorities of ID, commitment, and engagement are required for decisions based on established criteria that may be tied to operational capability and are rooted in the ROE. Multinational Considerations For the purposes of counterair, the intent of an ID process is to either facilitate airspace control or to support an engagement decision through CID. The objective of CID is to obtain the highest confidence, positive ID possible. Lacking positive ID, the objective is to reach the level of confidence in an ID that can be supported by the ROE for an engagement authority to make a decision. ID can be accomplished through several recognized methods (e.g., positive ID, procedural ID, auto-ID, formation assessment, or formation tracking). The JFC approves the procedures used for ID and designates who may be delegated that authority in the AADP and ACP. The AADC will establish the policy for ID authority, with JFC approval, and will promulgate it via the AADP, special instructions, and/or an operations task link supplement. Commit authority may be used (and delegated) by the AADC as a battle management tool. The air defense echelon with commit authority is permitted to authorize assets to prepare to engage an entity (e.g., position a DCA fighter to intercept or direct an air defense artillery unit to track and target). Commit authority does not imply engagement authority. The JFC is vested with authority to prosecute engagements within the theater/JOA consistent with ROE currently in effect. The air defense authority with engagement authority is permitted to authorize engagement of an air or missile threat. For air defense engagements within the integrated air defense system (IADS), the authority normally is delegated to the AADC who may further delegate the engagement authority to tactical levels (e.g., RADC/SADC). Special attention must be paid to establishing a workable CID system during MNF operations. A mix of units with dissimilar capabilities and differing electronic systems, fire control doctrine, and training can present the AADC with an extremely difficult air defense situation. Advanced planning may be required to compensate for a “patchwork” xvii
Executive Summary of separate MNF CID capabilities, not just for the surface air defense and air control units, but for their aircraft as well. Asset Protection Enabling Capabilities The JFC and staff, normally the plans directorate of a joint staff, develops a prioritized critical asset list (CAL) for each general phase of an operation with inputs from the components and based on the theater level protection required to support tasks/missions assigned by the JFC. The CAL should include designated assets and areas within the joint security areas (JSAs) of the JOA. For DCA protection, the joint security coordinator designated by the JFC normally coordinates with the AADC to ensure the JSAs are appropriately covered by the AADP. The completed CAL is forwarded to AADC, who will allocate available active AMD forces to defend the prioritized assets listed. The product of this effort is the defended asset list (DAL). The DAL is a list of those assets on the CAL that can be covered by JFC AMD forces and capabilities. Some enabling capabilities to take into account during counterair planning are: special operations; information operations; space operations; intelligence support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and air refueling. Offensive Counterair Planning and Operations General OCA Planning OCA operations normally have a high priority as long as the enemy has the air and missile capability to threaten friendly forces and the JFC does not have the degree of air superiority desired to accomplish the objectives required for the end state. OCA operations reduce the risk of air and missile attacks, allowing friendly forces to focus on their mission objectives. The preferred method of countering air and missile threats is to destroy or disrupt them prior to launch using OCA operations. OCA planning begins with JIPOE and IPB and considers the JFC’s assessment of the overall air and missile threat, the predicted effectiveness of the defense design, target database, ROE, objectives, priorities, missions, available friendly capabilities, and the weight of effort or force apportionment decision. IPB enhances the commanders’ ability to find targets, task attack forces, and assess their effectiveness. OCA planning includes targeting enemy air xviii JP 3-01
Page 1 and 2: Joint Publication 3-01 Countering A
Page 3 and 4: Preface Intentionally Blank ii JP 3
Page 5 and 6: Summary of Changes Intentionally Bl
Page 7 and 8: Table of Contents Section A. Intell
Page 9 and 10: Table of Contents III-2 Formation A
Page 11 and 12: Executive Summary defend itself. Sy
Page 13 and 14: Executive Summary • Designate an
Page 15 and 16: Executive Summary Cross Area of Res
Page 17: Executive Summary the JFC, are the
Page 21 and 22: Executive Summary Defensive Counter
Page 23 and 24: Executive Summary air-, and sea bas
Page 25 and 26: Chapter I (1) Air Superiority. Air
Page 27 and 28: Chapter I (b) Suppression of Enemy
Page 29 and 30: Chapter I (2) Establishing and moni
Page 31 and 32: Chapter I and surrounding territori
Page 33 and 34: Chapter I Intentionally Blank I-10
Page 35 and 36: Chapter II TACON while surface-base
Page 37 and 38: Chapter II (6) Establish, coordinat
Page 39 and 40: Chapter II some of the functions of
Page 41 and 42: Chapter II and air operations with
Page 43 and 44: Chapter II integration, and deconfl
Page 45 and 46: Chapter II (11) Make OCA attack ope
Page 47 and 48: Chapter II atmospheric) BM engageme
Page 49 and 50: Chapter II authority down to a RADC
Page 51 and 52: Chapter II Factors Affecting the Mi
Page 53 and 54: Chapter II including considerations
Page 55 and 56: Chapter II unit commander/JFLCC on
Page 57 and 58: Chapter II (6) Joint Interface Cont
Page 59 and 60: Chapter II all echelons to achieve
Page 61 and 62: Chapter II JFACC/AADC and authorize
Page 63 and 64: Chapter III making process, the JIP
Page 65 and 66: Chapter III Details regarding the J
Page 67 and 68: Chapter III Principles for Planning
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Chapter III (6) Procedures to exped
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Chapter III c. During forcible entr
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Chapter III minimizing duplication
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Chapter III scenarios, but generall
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Chapter III 13. Identification, Com
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Chapter III enemy (i.e., low confid
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Chapter III 17. Critical Asset List
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Chapter III (a) Level 1. Level 1 pr
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Chapter III and take advantage of r
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Chapter III commercial, and request
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Chapter III Intentionally Blank III
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Chapter IV threads that tie all joi
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Chapter IV (7) Assessment—the abi
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Chapter IV special operations, and
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Chapter IV SECTION B. OFFENSIVE COU
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Chapter IV (5) Major IADS C2 facili
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Chapter IV Refer to JP 3-60, Joint
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Chapter IV protect specific operati
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Chapter IV (2) An air support reque
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Chapter IV 10. Fighter Sweep a. The
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Chapter IV Intentionally Blank IV-2
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Chapter V (1) Centralized Planning
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Chapter V maritime forces in the ex
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Chapter V impact the theater-wide J
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Chapter V 1. Tracks not updating/tr
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Chapter V (2) DCA Estimate. Planner
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Chapter V (b) Point Defense. Point
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Chapter V 6. Delegate necessary aut
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Chapter V 1. DCA fighter aircraft a
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Chapter V (5) Firing Doctrine. Guid
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Chapter V (3) The likelihood and ti
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Chapter V (d) Chemical, Biological,
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Chapter V annihilation, AD aircraft
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Chapter V multitude of targets, som
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Chapter V Intentionally Blank V-28
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Appendix A e. Electronic methods pr
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Appendix A positive hostile IDs are
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Appendix A Intentionally Blank A-6
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Appendix B (3) Describe BM defense
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Appendix B ANNEXES: (List of notion
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Appendix B Enclosure 1: References
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Appendix C terrain and air avenues
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Appendix C (5) Passive and active D
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Appendix D b. Manufacturing. Countr
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Appendix D 45 minutes and relocated
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Appendix D 4. Cruise Missiles a. A
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Appendix D infrastructure, logistic
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Appendix D Gulf War The initial hop
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Appendix E terrestrial services. Th
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Appendix E supporting commander, ba
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Appendix E delegated to the lowest
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Appendix E under attack, and the ti
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Appendix E development, testing, an
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Appendix E Intentionally Blank E-12
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Appendix F m. JP 3-27, Homeland Def
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Appendix G 6. Distribution of Elect
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Glossary C2 CAL CAP CAS CBRN CCDR C
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Glossary JFC JFCC-IMD JFLCC JFMCC J
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Glossary TACS TAGS TAOC TDL TEL TGM
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Glossary air defense direction cent
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Glossary combat air patrol. An airc
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Glossary flight advisory. None. (Ap
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Glossary employed to engage air thr
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Glossary radar netting unit. None.
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Glossary been identified. (Approved
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