JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Appendix A
e. Electronic methods provide the earliest and most reliable means of positive ID.
Positive visual ID may be required by the ROE in some scenarios, but may not be practical
in others due to time and distances or consideration of an enemy’s BVR weapons
capabilities. For example, due to their unique flight profiles, ROE normally allow BMs and
CMs, with high-confidence ID, to be engaged immediately—the approved ROE being the
controlling factor. It is important that ROE allow for the most advantageous means of ID.
While airspace control can function with an effective combination of different methods of
ID, AD engagements (with few exceptions) require positive ID (e.g., visual observation or
electronic ID). For example, for SEAD operations, correct ID of all friendly electromagnetic
signal emitters is important to prevent erroneous suppression (destruction or disruption) of
friendly force electronic systems. Experience has shown that some friendly forces’
electronic emitters are not properly identified to the SEAD forces. Those spurious emitters
may be read as “unknown” or “hostile” by a SEAD aircrew, and dependent upon the ROE
and intensity of the situation, that emitter may be engaged, perhaps in self-defense, unless
positive ID is accomplished. If that friendly force with a spurious emitter could be positively
identified by secure electronic means (i.e., CID), it would probably not be engaged in that
context.
f. In the absence of positive ID, procedural ID may be used based on ROE and the
commander’s decision to accept the potential increased risks of fratricide or misidentification
of enemy as friend. For example, when a surface AD unit becomes autonomous and
procedurally reverts to a self-defense mode, the threat of fratricide may increase because that
unit would be more likely to engage friendly aircraft that fly toward the unit. Procedural ID
methods using airspeed, altitude, and planned flight corridors as parameters may mitigate the
perceived threat to the AMD unit.
g. ROE are critical to both the ID and CID processes. ROE directly supports the CID
process and should allow for the most advantageous means of identifying a detected object:
the CID process identifies friend or foe and ROE determines response. A good example is
the ID criteria for missiles, which normally should be different than that for aircraft.
Because BMs have a distinct flight profile, with little warning, and a very short opportunity
for intercept, the ROE should allow for advantageous ID and immediate engagement.
Experience has shown the ROE for incoming enemy CMs, once detected and classified as a
CM using high confidence means, also should allow immediate engagement because they are
difficult to continuously track.
4. Identification Matrix
The AADC should develop an ID matrix to complement the ID process normally used
for tracking and to facilitate engagement decisions. Often, track ID on the TDL may be from
procedural methods that will not support the ROE criteria for engagement. The TDL will
carry that track ID classification (e.g., a hostile ID track), but the engagement authority may
require either positive ID, a determination of hostile act/intent, or violation of a procedural
ID restriction before an engagement decision is made. To that end, CID criteria contained in
the matrix and in all plans must be coordinated to ensure no conflicts arise during execution
of counterair operations.
A-2 JP 3-01