JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Executive Summary
Defensive Counterair Planning and Operations
General
Because of their timesensitive
nature, DCA
operations require
streamlined coordination
and decision-making
processes.
DCA Planning
DCA Assets
Integrated Air Defense
Systems
Enemy Air and Missile
Threats
DCA operations consist of active and passive AMD
measures executed through a joint C2 infrastructure. The
AADC normally is responsible for developing an IADS by
integrating the capabilities of different components with a
robust C2 architecture. The AADC uses assigned
operation/campaign plan tasks to develop the AADP with
the coordination of component commanders, MNF
partners, and the JFC’s staff.
The AADP is designed to be a plan of action for DCA
operations, and the RADCs/SADCs, if established, may be
required or may wish to provide supplements to the AADP
to reflect additional guidance or intentions. DCA planning
should adhere to the following principles and ideals:
centralized planning and direction; decentralized execution;
planned responses; effective and efficient communications;
layered defense; 360-degree coverage; ID and tracking;
alert and warning; and establish modes of control.
DCA operations employ a mix of weapon, sensor,
communications, and C2 systems integrated from all
components into an IADS to protect friendly forces, assets,
population centers, and interests from air and missile
threats.
An IADS is not a formal system in itself but the aggregate
of Service/functional component AMD systems comprising
sensors, weapons, C2, communications, intelligence
systems, and personnel operating in a theater/JOA under
the command of an AADC. However, the IADS typically
depends on support and enabling functions from national
assets and systems not controlled by the JFC. Because the
IADS is normally composed of different components, it
requires significant integration and interoperability of
communications and tactical data link architectures to
generate its expected synergistic effects for the JFC. To
ensure counterair situational awareness and enable decision
making, plans for an IADS must include the requirement
for a reliable, consistent COP/CTP available in all major
and supporting C2 facilities.
Enemy threats comprise two main elements: air threats,
including manned and unmanned aircraft and CM, and BM.
GCCs should specifically focus intelligence efforts on
potential adversaries and their air and missile threats in
xx JP 3-01