JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Chapter III
enemy (i.e., low confidence-high risk). This remains a commander’s decision. For example,
during DCA operations against numerous simultaneous attacks by enemy aircraft and CMs,
potentially with WMD, it may be necessary to accept lower confidence ID methods for
hostiles and increased risk of fratricide to minimize the risk of a “leaker” getting through to
the target. Unambiguous lines of command and clarity of ROE are particularly important to
the CID process, especially when delegating authority for engagement decisions during
decentralized execution.
c. The CID process is for all joint forces and for defensive action as well as
offensive. For example, CID may provide a positive ID of friendly SOF positioned in close
proximity to a high-priority target system deep in enemy territory being attacked from the
air. The leader/battle manager of the attacking force would use that CID when making an
engagement decision on that target.
d. A CID matrix is a good tool for the CID process for counterair. To that end, the CID
matrix should mirror the ID criteria and the CID process contained in the counterair plans
and must be coordinated to ensure no conflicts arise during joint operations.
See Appendix A, “Combat Identification,” for additional discussion of CID and a sample ID
process matrix.
15. Multinational Considerations
a. Special attention must be paid to establishing a workable CID system during MNF
operations. A mix of units with dissimilar capabilities and differing electronic systems, fire
control doctrine, and training can present the AADC with an extremely difficult AD
situation. Advanced planning may be required to compensate for a “patchwork” of separate
MNF CID capabilities, not just for the surface AD and air control units, but for their aircraft
as well.
b. No matter how well integrated a CID system is, as much training as possible should
be conducted to facilitate the CID processes. Means of positive ID should be stressed as
early in the planning phases as possible and every effort made to devise a system of positive
ID for each MNF members’ aircraft when airborne.
c. In addition to the ID/CID obstacles, the AADC must ensure the promulgation of that
data throughout the MNF. While US joint forces may have TDL, many MNF may not have
the same TDL interoperability.
16. General
SECTION E. ASSET PROTECTION
a. The JFC and staff, normally the plans directorate of a joint staff, develops a
prioritized critical asset list (CAL) (see Figure III-3) for each general phase of an operation
with inputs from the components and based on the theater level protection required to
support tasks/missions assigned by the JFC. Within each general phase (e.g., seize initiative
phase), subordinate JFCs or component commanders may establish additional phases that fit
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