JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

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1. General CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION “If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and we lose it quickly.” Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery British Army, 1908-1958 a. The joint force commander (JFC) counters air and missile threats to ensure friendly freedom of action, provide protection, and deny enemy freedom of action. Counterair integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. Offensive counterair (OCA) typically seeks to dominate enemy airspace and destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures as close to their sources as possible before and after launch. Defensive counterair (DCA) normally attempts to degrade, neutralize, or defeat enemy air and missile attacks attempting to penetrate friendly airspace. Counterair operations may also be conducted to ensure access and freedom of action in international airspace. These operations may use aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), artillery, ground forces, special operations, and electronic attack (EA). US forces must be capable of countering the air and missile threats during all phases. b. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). IAMD is an evolving approach that uses the counterair framework at the theater level. IAMD emphasizes the integration of OCA attack operations, DCA operations, and other capabilities as required to create the JFC’s desired effects. The geographic combatant commander (GCC) is responsible for IAMD operations within the theater. The IAMD approach also encompasses global strike and global missile defense beyond the theater level. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) establishes command relationships for global ballistic missile defense (GBMD), global strike, and other cross-area of responsibility (AOR) operations. Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) is responsible for synchronizing planning for global missile defense. Refer to Chapter II, “Command and Control,” Section A, “Command Relationships and Responsibilities,” for cross-AOR command relationships considerations and Appendix E, “Global Ballistic Missile Defense Synchronization,” for further discussion. c. The counterair mission is inherently a joint and interdependent endeavor. Each component of the joint force contributes capabilities necessary for mission success. In addition, Service capability and force structure development reflect a purposeful reliance on all components to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects while minimizing relative vulnerabilities. Due to the joint and interdependent nature, all components of the joint force normally are tasked to conduct operations in support of the counterair mission. Unity of command (or unity of effort), centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are also vital tenets for countering air and missile threats. I-1
Chapter I (1) Air Superiority. Air superiority is that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, maritime, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force’s air and missile threats. Historically, air superiority has proven to be a prerequisite to success for an operation/campaign because it prevents enemy air and missile threats from interfering with operations of friendly air, land, maritime, space, and special operations forces, assuring freedom of action and movement. Counterair operations usually begin early in the conduct of a campaign to produce the desired degree of air superiority at the times and places chosen by the JFC. (a) The degree of control of the air domain may vary from local air superiority to theater air supremacy, depending on the situation and the JFC’s concept of operations (CONOPS). In some situations the commander may have limited resources, having only adequate assets to establish air superiority for specific periods of time. However, air superiority may not totally eliminate the air and missile threats. (b) Joint force requirements for air superiority may be continuous or temporary. JFCs conduct continuous counterair operations to maintain the desired degree of air superiority over the homeland, key US assets, and designated portions of friendly territory. When necessary, JFCs conduct counterair operations to establish and maintain the desired degree of air superiority over friendly territory, in international airspace, and over enemy territory in a manner, time, and place of the JFC’s choosing. (2) Protection. Protection focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting potential. One of the key tasks associated with the protection function is providing air and missile defense (AMD). In this regard, the JFC is responsible for protecting US and friendly forces, US vital interests, friendly population centers, logistic sites, other critical assets, and politically sensitive assets of host nations (HNs) during all phases of operations. To adequately protect the force, commanders must employ complementary weapon systems and sensors, including active and passive AMD. These operations not only defend against attack, but also ensure that US forces can strike potential threats prior to their employment against friendly forces. For additional information regarding homeland defense (HD), see Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, Homeland Defense. 2. Counterair Framework The counterair mission integrates both offensive and defensive operations, by all capable joint force components, and counters the air and missile threat by attaining and maintaining the degree of air superiority and protection desired by the JFC (see Figure I-1). Counterair operations may use the range of military capabilities to neutralize or destroy enemy aircraft, missiles, and launchers before and after launch. Generally, OCA operations seek to dominate enemy airspace and prevent the launch of threats, while DCA operations defeat enemy air and missile threats attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace. Joint forces must be integrated to exploit the mutually beneficial effects of synchronized offensive and defensive operations to destroy, neutralize, or minimize air and missile threats. I-2 JP 3-01
Page 1 and 2: Joint Publication 3-01 Countering A
Page 3 and 4: Preface Intentionally Blank ii JP 3
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Chapter III scenarios, but generall
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Chapter III 13. Identification, Com
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Chapter III enemy (i.e., low confid
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Chapter III 17. Critical Asset List
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Chapter III (a) Level 1. Level 1 pr
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Chapter III and take advantage of r
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Chapter III commercial, and request
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Chapter III Intentionally Blank III
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Chapter IV threads that tie all joi
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Chapter IV (7) Assessment—the abi
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Chapter IV special operations, and
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Chapter IV SECTION B. OFFENSIVE COU
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Chapter IV (5) Major IADS C2 facili
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Chapter IV Refer to JP 3-60, Joint
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Chapter IV protect specific operati
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Chapter IV (2) An air support reque
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Chapter IV 10. Fighter Sweep a. The
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Chapter IV Intentionally Blank IV-2
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Chapter V (1) Centralized Planning
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Chapter V maritime forces in the ex
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Chapter V impact the theater-wide J
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Chapter V 1. Tracks not updating/tr
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Chapter V (2) DCA Estimate. Planner
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Chapter V (b) Point Defense. Point
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Chapter V 6. Delegate necessary aut
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Chapter V 1. DCA fighter aircraft a
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Chapter V (5) Firing Doctrine. Guid
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Chapter V (3) The likelihood and ti
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Chapter V (d) Chemical, Biological,
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Chapter V annihilation, AD aircraft
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Chapter V multitude of targets, som
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Chapter V Intentionally Blank V-28
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Appendix A e. Electronic methods pr
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Appendix A positive hostile IDs are
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Appendix A Intentionally Blank A-6
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Appendix B (3) Describe BM defense
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Appendix B ANNEXES: (List of notion
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Appendix B Enclosure 1: References
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Appendix C terrain and air avenues
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Appendix C (5) Passive and active D
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Appendix D b. Manufacturing. Countr
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Appendix D 45 minutes and relocated
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Appendix D 4. Cruise Missiles a. A
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Appendix D infrastructure, logistic
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Appendix D Gulf War The initial hop
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Appendix E terrestrial services. Th
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Appendix E supporting commander, ba
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Appendix E delegated to the lowest
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Appendix E under attack, and the ti
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Appendix E development, testing, an
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Appendix E Intentionally Blank E-12
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Appendix F m. JP 3-27, Homeland Def
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Appendix G 6. Distribution of Elect
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Glossary C2 CAL CAP CAS CBRN CCDR C
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Glossary JFC JFCC-IMD JFLCC JFMCC J
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Glossary TACS TAGS TAOC TDL TEL TGM
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Glossary air defense direction cent
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Glossary combat air patrol. An airc
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Glossary flight advisory. None. (Ap
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Glossary employed to engage air thr
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Glossary radar netting unit. None.
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Glossary been identified. (Approved
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