JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Chapter III
Principles for Planning Airspace Control
• Interoperability
• Unity of effort
• Mass and timing
• Integrated planning cycles
• Degraded operations
Figure III-1. Principles for Planning Airspace Control
(2) Unity of Effort. The ACS must be integrated and coordinated with the AMD
system, including dual tasking of assets as necessary. Integration of an HN AD system (as
part of an IADS) and air traffic control (ATC) system should be properly planned. Proper
liaison is essential and should be identified and exercised prior to hostilities when integrating
HN and joint force airspace control.
(3) Mass and Timing. Planning should consider the aircraft traffic volume and
timing to fully integrate DCA with OCA and other joint missions. Constraints may require
changes in positive or procedural control measures.
(4) Integrated Planning Cycles. The airspace control planning cycle must be
integrated with the joint operation/campaign planning cycle, and more specifically, the
AADP planning cycle. The ACP normally is added as an appendix to the operations annex
of the joint OPLAN or operation order.
(5) Degraded Operations. The ACP must anticipate degraded operations of
airspace control and AD systems as the results of attacks (combat losses) and enemy EW
efforts. Loss of communications can dramatically degrade positive control measures.
Effective plans should span the spectrum from minimal to full degradation and consider the
effects of adverse weather and night operations.
Refer to JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for detailed information regarding airspace
control, the ACP, and the ACO.
b. Military ATC facilities and radar control units (e.g., Marine TAOC, or Air Force
CRC) normally will provide flight following and monitoring throughout the airspace control
area. If an HN ATC system is used before hostilities, then procedures must be in place to
revert to the military system when required. The urgent exchange of information between
the ATC facilities, radar control units, and airspace users requires reliable voice and data
nets; radars; identification, friend or foe (IFF); and selective ID features. Accurate and
timely ID enhances engagement of enemy aircraft and missiles, conserves friendly
resources, and reduces risk to friendly forces.
c. Key factors to consider when developing the ACP are as follows:
(1) The ACP should be coordinated with the HN and any partner nations if it
includes their airspace or their systems.
III-6 JP 3-01