JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Counterair Planning<br />
d. IPB assists the counterair planner in visualizing the operational environment,<br />
assessing adversary air <strong>and</strong> missile capabilities, <strong>and</strong> identifying the adversary’s probable<br />
intent <strong>and</strong> attack locations. IPB is not simply enumeration of adversary air <strong>and</strong> missile<br />
systems, but must describe how the adversary air <strong>and</strong> missile forces operate.<br />
e. JIPOE/IPB for counterair relates to any information about adversary air <strong>and</strong> missile<br />
threats <strong>and</strong> supporting infrastructure, including information on enemy ADs, C2 networks,<br />
radar coverage, <strong>and</strong> other early warning/detection systems, etc. JIPOE/IPB will provide<br />
available information on the following:<br />
them.<br />
(1) Location, status, <strong>and</strong> disposition of WMD <strong>and</strong> the capabilities for employing<br />
(2) <strong>Air</strong>craft operating bases <strong>and</strong> dispersal sites, to include aircraft carriers <strong>and</strong> other<br />
air capable ships.<br />
(3) <strong>Missile</strong> target systems, including their infrastructure, storage <strong>and</strong> operating<br />
locations, launch platforms, C2 nodes, missile stocks, forward operating locations/bases<br />
(FOLs/FOBs), transload sites, reloading/refueling sites, terrain <strong>and</strong> road infrastructure<br />
(bridges, tunnels) where their destruction could interrupt enemy missile operations <strong>and</strong><br />
logistics. For example, intelligence will identify BM operating areas where an adversary’s<br />
missile C2, infrastructure, <strong>and</strong> forces may operate.<br />
(4) Order of battle of adversary IADS (i.e., aircraft, SAMs, airfields, <strong>and</strong><br />
antiaircraft artillery [AAA]), including C2 systems (i.e., early warning/ground control<br />
intercept [GCI] sites <strong>and</strong> facilities), communication links, <strong>and</strong> any associated facilities.<br />
(5) Signals intelligence capabilities <strong>and</strong> EW assets, including operating<br />
instructions, vulnerabilities, redundancies, capabilities, <strong>and</strong> locations.<br />
(6) Changes by adversary in direct <strong>and</strong> indirect threat emitters, including wartime<br />
reserve modes <strong>and</strong> reprogramming of target sensing weapon systems.<br />
(7) Climate <strong>and</strong> terrain within the JOA <strong>and</strong> their effects on friendly <strong>and</strong> enemy<br />
operations.<br />
(8) Overall assessment of the strengths <strong>and</strong> vulnerabilities of adversary offensive<br />
<strong>and</strong> defensive air systems, including location <strong>and</strong> status of all key nodes <strong>and</strong> targets that<br />
affect their ability to sustain air operations.<br />
(9) Analysis of adversary’s potential escalation COAs if their leadership, national<br />
C2, <strong>and</strong> other strategic systems are attacked.<br />
(10) Adversary preparations, including camouflage, concealment, <strong>and</strong> deception;<br />
movement of noncombatants <strong>and</strong> civilians; ID of no-strike sites; indications of hidden enemy<br />
capabilities; etc.<br />
III-3