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JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

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Chapter V<br />

multitude of targets, some systems are capable of automatic detection <strong>and</strong> engagement.<br />

Surface-to-air systems operate under fire control orders based on the ROE <strong>and</strong> WCS.<br />

(2) <strong>Air</strong>-to-<strong>Air</strong> Fighter Interception. Fighter aircraft performing DCA or OCA<br />

missions may be tasked to respond to the detection of hostile, potentially hostile, or unknown<br />

airborne targets. <strong>Air</strong>craft normally operate under positive control of a C2 element but may<br />

initiate <strong>and</strong> conduct intercepts autonomously when authorized (e.g., self-defense or depth of<br />

the operation precludes positive control). When close or positive control is not possible, the<br />

controlling element may provide general broadcast information on targets to all affected<br />

fighters. <strong>Air</strong>-to-air fighters operating with enhanced fire control radars can engage multiple<br />

targets with BVR weapons to defend against hostile targets before they are within<br />

threatening range of friendly assets. However, the ROE must allow use of BVR weapons.<br />

(a) AD fighter aircraft normally perform CAPs, DCA fighter escort, or respond<br />

to airborne threats from ground alert locations. Fighters normally will be under positive<br />

control for vectors toward their airborne targets. CAPs include barrier CAPs for area defense<br />

<strong>and</strong> CAPs for base defense or local asset defense. Some CAPs also may have additional<br />

missions such as using barrier CAPs to inspect or “sanitize” returning strike packages to<br />

ensure enemy aircraft do not shadow “friendlies” back to base. Additionally, DCA fighters<br />

may be dedicated to protect HVAAs from airborne threats.<br />

(b) C2 elements also provide a link between the JAOC combat operations<br />

division <strong>and</strong> the fighters. This communication link provides a flexible <strong>and</strong> reactive C2<br />

arrangement for retasking flights to meet dynamic DCA operational requirements or to<br />

support OCA operations.<br />

(c) NAVFOR CAPs defending carrier or amphibious groups may be positioned<br />

over l<strong>and</strong> during littoral operations <strong>and</strong> can provide collateral defense of the l<strong>and</strong> AO.<br />

g. Other Employment Considerations<br />

(1) Movement <strong>and</strong> Mobility. US surface-based AMD forces are normally<br />

moveable or mobile. When operations require ground AMD units to change location,<br />

displacement times must be considered. Dependent upon the weapon system <strong>and</strong> situation,<br />

these surface unit displacements may take hours or days. Extensive coordination may be<br />

required for convoy plans, permissions, protection, realignment of logistics, travel time, <strong>and</strong><br />

shifting of backfill forces may be necessary. Maritime forces afloat are capable of full<br />

operations while repositioning.<br />

(2) Cross-Boundary Operations. Boundaries between sectors <strong>and</strong> between forces<br />

<strong>and</strong> units are areas of risk. Procedures for distribution <strong>and</strong> control of fires between sectors<br />

<strong>and</strong> units should be addressed during planning. To minimize the risk of fratricide <strong>and</strong><br />

prevent excessive weapons employment while providing a seamless defense, coordination<br />

must be rehearsed, not just planned. When engagements cross a unit boundary or are in a<br />

buffer zone, priority of fires normally will be given to the threatened unit.<br />

(3) Alert Posture. Levels of readiness should be tailored to the level of threat <strong>and</strong><br />

warning. Crews <strong>and</strong> systems cannot be maintained at high levels of alert status indefinitely.<br />

V-26 <strong>JP</strong> 3-<strong>01</strong>

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