JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

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1. General APPENDIX E GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYNCHRONIZATION GBMD is the overarching characterization of the cumulative (worldwide) planning, synchronization, integration, coordination, and asset management of defensive capabilities designed to destroy, neutralize, or reduce the effectiveness of enemy BM attacks within or across any GCC’s AOR boundaries. a. Global BM Threats. The BM threat continues to increase both quantitatively and qualitatively. Worldwide trends indicate BM systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate. A number of states are favoring longer-range BMs and increasing their ability to penetrate missile defenses. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their missiles. Such capabilities could significantly increase their utility both during conflict as well as in times of relative peace, when adversaries may use them to coerce states into actions contrary to US interests. The potential for proliferation to state and non-state actors may have significant impacts to regional and global stability. Certain regional actors continue to develop long-range missiles that threaten the US and its friends, and allies. Uncertainty exists about when and how this type of intercontinental ballistic missile threat will mature. Additionally, SRBMs/MRBMs continue to increase as threats. The advance in threats and evolution of technical solutions necessitate strategic solutions to the deployment of low-density, high-demand missile defense assets at the theater level. BMD deployments must be tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each theater, which may vary considerably by geography, the character of the threat, and the military-to-military relationships on which to build partnerships and cooperation for missile defense. BMs, whether employed in standard, lofted, or depressed trajectories, present unique problems, including high velocities and short reaction times for the defender. Accordingly, the proliferation of missile technology and WMD requires BMD capabilities for defending the homeland and deployed forces, as well as protecting allies and partners overseas. b. BMD Systems. To accomplish BMD globally, USSTRATCOM, working with the GCCs, integrates and synchronizes a wide range of sensors, interceptors, and C2 elements. Systems collectively employed include sensors (air, land, sea, and space), weapons (ground, air, and sea based), C2, manning, and logistics. These include GMD, THAAD, Aegis-BMD, Patriot, Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs), the COBRA DANE radar, the Sea- Based X-band radar, AN/TPY-2 Forward Based Mode radars, space-based Infrared System/Defense Support Program satellites, Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications system, and applicable partner nation BMD capabilities. c. GBMD is supported by communications, comprised of the infrastructure which physically connects strategic and regional missile defense assets in support of operational and/or research, development, test, and evaluation activities. The main communications network used by GMD is the BMD COMNET. This network may be comprised of numerous distinct communications systems including, but not limited to, military and commercial satellite communications and Defense Information System Agency provisioned E-1
Appendix E terrestrial services. The BMD COMNET includes the GMD Communications Network and Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications BMD Communication Network. 2. Global Ballistic Missile Defense Roles and Responsibilities a. The UCP tasks each CCDR with, “Detecting, deterring, and preventing attacks against the United States, its territories and bases, and employing appropriate force to defend the nation should deterrence fail.” CCDRs will coordinate the employment of active and passive missile defense measures and strike forces to defeat BM attacks in all phases of flight, or prior to their launch. Each GCC is the “supported” commander for all operations conducted to defeat BM threats in their respective AOR. A missile launch that crosses AOR boundaries complicates C2 of defensive assets and requires coordination among multiple GCCs. For theater BMD, a GCC may control all elements involved; however, as the range of threat missiles increases, and depending on the location of their launchers, so does the potential for cross-AOR BM attacks. This will test the speed and reliability of C2 which ties sensors and interceptors to decision makers across traditional command boundaries. The need to close gaps and seams across AOR boundaries led to the UCP direction for CDRUSSTRATCOM to be responsible for synchronizing the planning for global missile defense. All GCCs and subordinate JFCs coordinate their BMD planning and support with USSTRATCOM JFCC-IMD. b. Many organizations have a role in BMD. By its very nature, BMD is inherently joint and may be executed in multiple AORs simultaneously by the affected GCCs. Because there are no overarching GBMD C2 structures, GCCs use existing theater AMD C2 organizations (e.g., AADCs, AAMDCs, RADCs, and SADCs) to conduct BMD, and they must coordinate across AOR boundaries. 3. General Ballistic Missile Defense Characteristics a. BMD consists of passive AD, active AD, attack operations, and battle management. It aligns with DCA required for BM threats when a JFC conducts counterair operations (see counterair framework diagram in Chapter I, “Introduction,” Figure I-1). b. GBMD includes capabilities to detect, deter, defend against, and defeat adversary BM threats. GBMD must synchronize and integrate defensive capabilities to destroy or disrupt adversary missiles prior to launch, or to defeat inbound missiles in all phases of flight. Effective and efficient GBMD requires a balanced use of resources among the GCCs. To achieve unity of effort, GBMD will need to fully synchronize defensive actions and supporting systems to engage a target with multiple weapons systems throughout its trajectory. c. Effective GBMD battle management requires shared situational awareness, effective management of high-demand–low-density resources, directing and controlling the correct actions in a timely manner, and monitoring and assessing the execution. GBMD utilizes a wide range of integrated BMD battle-management and planning systems to mitigate complexities associated with multiple theater BMD events. E-2 JP 3-01
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Joint Publication 3-01 Countering A
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Preface Intentionally Blank ii JP 3
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Summary of Changes Intentionally Bl
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Table of Contents Section A. Intell
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Table of Contents III-2 Formation A
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Executive Summary defend itself. Sy
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Executive Summary • Designate an
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Executive Summary Cross Area of Res
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Executive Summary the JFC, are the
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Executive Summary of separate MNF C
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Executive Summary Defensive Counter
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Executive Summary air-, and sea bas
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Chapter I (1) Air Superiority. Air
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Chapter I (b) Suppression of Enemy
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Chapter I (2) Establishing and moni
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Chapter I and surrounding territori
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Chapter I Intentionally Blank I-10
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Chapter II TACON while surface-base
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Chapter II (6) Establish, coordinat
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Chapter II some of the functions of
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Chapter II and air operations with
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Chapter II integration, and deconfl
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Chapter II (11) Make OCA attack ope
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Chapter II atmospheric) BM engageme
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Chapter II authority down to a RADC
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Chapter II Factors Affecting the Mi
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Chapter II including considerations
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Chapter II unit commander/JFLCC on
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Chapter II (6) Joint Interface Cont
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Chapter II all echelons to achieve
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Chapter II JFACC/AADC and authorize
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Chapter III making process, the JIP
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Chapter III Details regarding the J
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Chapter III Principles for Planning
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Chapter III (6) Procedures to exped
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Chapter III c. During forcible entr
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Chapter III minimizing duplication
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Chapter III scenarios, but generall
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Chapter III 13. Identification, Com
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Chapter III enemy (i.e., low confid
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Chapter III 17. Critical Asset List
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Chapter III (a) Level 1. Level 1 pr
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Chapter III and take advantage of r
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Chapter III commercial, and request
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Chapter III Intentionally Blank III
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Chapter IV threads that tie all joi
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Chapter IV (7) Assessment—the abi
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Chapter IV special operations, and
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Chapter IV SECTION B. OFFENSIVE COU
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Chapter IV (5) Major IADS C2 facili
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Chapter IV Refer to JP 3-60, Joint
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Chapter IV protect specific operati
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Chapter IV (2) An air support reque
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Chapter IV 10. Fighter Sweep a. The
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Chapter V (1) Centralized Planning
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Page 131 and 132: Chapter V (d) Chemical, Biological,
Page 133 and 134: Chapter V annihilation, AD aircraft
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Page 145 and 146: Appendix B (3) Describe BM defense
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Page 151 and 152: Appendix C terrain and air avenues
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Page 159 and 160: Appendix D 4. Cruise Missiles a. A
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Page 177 and 178: Appendix F m. JP 3-27, Homeland Def
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Page 181 and 182: Glossary C2 CAL CAP CAS CBRN CCDR C
Page 183 and 184: Glossary JFC JFCC-IMD JFLCC JFMCC J
Page 185 and 186: Glossary TACS TAGS TAOC TDL TEL TGM
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Page 191 and 192: Glossary flight advisory. None. (Ap
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Page 195 and 196: Glossary radar netting unit. None.
Page 197 and 198: Glossary been identified. (Approved
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