JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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<strong>Defense</strong> Counterair Planning <strong>and</strong> Operations<br />
(f) Visual ID.<br />
(g) Point of origin.<br />
(h) Track maneuvers (e.g., noncompliance with ACMs).<br />
(i) Validated speed, direction, altitude, <strong>and</strong> hostile intent/act.<br />
(j) Formation assessment (“guilt by association”). Formation assessment is a<br />
procedural ID that can be used to identify all members in a group of targets. This group ID<br />
is based on the ID of at least one member of the group (using ID criteria). Factors such as<br />
similarity to known threat tactical formations <strong>and</strong> relative spatial relationships (distance,<br />
speed, <strong>and</strong> altitude) contribute to the formation assessment ID of the group. Once the group<br />
has been identified <strong>and</strong> the group is observed to split, all contacts in each of the resulting<br />
groups maintain the ID. This ID methodology requires that one or more radar systems (e.g.,<br />
fighter or surface) continuously monitor the group or groups during the split. The group is<br />
considered “continuously tracked” if not lost/faded for more than one radar sweep/cycle.<br />
Note: Army ADA systems (with the exception of Patriot) do not use group IDs <strong>and</strong> each<br />
track is evaluated using current ID criteria.<br />
c. It is incumbent on the combat system making the ID (having ID authority) <strong>and</strong> the<br />
TDL operator to ensure tracks are correctly identified. Every opportunity within tactical<br />
timelines should be taken to resolve all track <strong>and</strong> ID ambiguities prior to engagement by<br />
firing units. Evaluation reports with details of tracking shortfalls may be researched at the<br />
Joint Deployable Analysis Team (JDAT). See the JDAT Web site at https://jdat.eglin.af.mil.<br />
d. During plans development, the parameters <strong>and</strong> details for positive <strong>and</strong> procedural ID,<br />
auto-ID systems, formation assessment, <strong>and</strong> CID should be developed <strong>and</strong> approved by the<br />
JFC along with the ROE <strong>and</strong> promulgated as discussed in Chapter III, “Counterair<br />
Planning,” Section D, “Identification.”<br />
Refer to FM 3-<strong>01</strong>.15/MCRP 3-25E/NTTP 3-<strong>01</strong>.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics,<br />
Techniques, <strong>and</strong> Procedures for an Integrated <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> System, for a detailed discussion<br />
of the ID/CID process within an IADS.<br />
7. Area <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> Planning<br />
a. Planning Considerations. Development of the AADP <strong>and</strong> planning DCA<br />
operations involves integrating friendly force capabilities <strong>and</strong> limitations against adversary<br />
vulnerabilities to achieve optimum results in a dynamic tactical environment. Factors that<br />
should be taken into consideration for planning include:<br />
(1) Mission Analysis. The mission statement is the AADC’s expression of what<br />
DCA forces must accomplish <strong>and</strong> why. During mission analysis, the AADC translates<br />
specified <strong>and</strong> implied tasks into missions for the component <strong>and</strong> subordinate comm<strong>and</strong>s with<br />
DCA assets. Intent of the JFC, the current situation, resources available, <strong>and</strong> the desired end<br />
state contribute to the mission statement.<br />
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