JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Counterair Planning<br />
authority <strong>and</strong> criteria. ID authority is the authority to assign an identity classification to an<br />
unknown contact, if possible. This authority is inherent within the C2 chain. The JFC<br />
normally delegates ID authority to JFACC/AADC <strong>and</strong> authorizes further delegation to<br />
subordinate comm<strong>and</strong>ers for decentralized execution as allowed by ROE <strong>and</strong> necessitated by<br />
the operational situation. ID authority <strong>and</strong> ID criteria should be stated <strong>and</strong> discussed in the<br />
AADP <strong>and</strong> ACP for approval by the JFC. Both ID authority <strong>and</strong> criteria may require<br />
modification, sometimes in conjunction with ROE, in a dynamic operational<br />
environment <strong>and</strong>/or with changes in phases of the campaign.<br />
b. ID is an essential <strong>and</strong> inseparable part of airspace control <strong>and</strong> AD operations.<br />
Comprehensive surveillance <strong>and</strong> accurate <strong>and</strong> persistent tracking combined with accurate,<br />
timely, <strong>and</strong> consistent ID enhances situational awareness, improves weapons employment<br />
options, helps conserve friendly resources, <strong>and</strong> reduces the risk of fratricide.<br />
c. The CID process complements the ID process to support application of weapons<br />
resources <strong>and</strong> other military options. For counterair, CID should be accomplished with NRT<br />
or better exchange of information between airspace control/AD units <strong>and</strong> airspace users to<br />
meet the time <strong>and</strong> accuracy dem<strong>and</strong>s of combat operations. CID is discussed separately in<br />
paragraph 14, “Combat Identification.”<br />
12. Methods of Identification<br />
a. For the purposes of counterair, the intent of an ID process is to either facilitate<br />
airspace control or to support an engagement decision through CID. The objective of CID is<br />
to obtain the highest confidence, positive ID possible. Lacking positive ID, the objective is<br />
to reach the level of confidence in an ID that can be supported by the ROE for an<br />
engagement authority to make a decision. ID can be accomplished through several<br />
recognized methods. The JFC approves the procedures used for ID <strong>and</strong> designates who may<br />
be delegated that authority in the AADP <strong>and</strong> ACP.<br />
b. Positive ID. Positive ID is ID derived from visual recognition, electronic support<br />
systems, noncooperative target recognition techniques, IFF systems, or other physics-based<br />
ID techniques. Positive ID does not assume identity solely based on location or adherence to<br />
airspace procedures. To prevent fratricide or undesired engagements, positive ID normally is<br />
required by ROE as a basis for CID for engagement (shoot/no-shoot) decisions for air<br />
threats. Normally, a positive ID means much more than a simple “lack of friend” or “lack of<br />
enemy” level of accuracy. The degree of accuracy of a positive ID method is specific to that<br />
method <strong>and</strong> should remain a constant, whereas CID criteria can be changed by the JFC based<br />
on ROE. Positive ID ACMs should be established in the AADP <strong>and</strong> ACP <strong>and</strong> can be<br />
modified through ACMs promulgated by ACOs <strong>and</strong> the SPINS.<br />
c. Procedural ID. Procedural ID is based on adherence to airspace control measures<br />
<strong>and</strong> rules. ID is assumed to be friendly as long as rules are followed, but ID is assumed<br />
hostile if rules are not followed <strong>and</strong> the suspect vehicle is not otherwise positively identified.<br />
Procedural ID separates airspace users by geography, altitude, heading, time, <strong>and</strong>/or<br />
maneuver. Normally, a combination of positive <strong>and</strong> procedural ID is used to identify<br />
friendly <strong>and</strong> hostile tracks. Procedural ID can be advantageous for some missions <strong>and</strong><br />
III-13