JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Chapter IV<br />
(5) Major IADS C2 facilities.<br />
(6) Operations <strong>and</strong> maintenance facilities, equipment, <strong>and</strong> personnel.<br />
(7) Logistic support (e.g., fuel storage, munitions depots, electrical power<br />
generation <strong>and</strong> transmission).<br />
(8) ISR <strong>and</strong> target acquisition systems.<br />
(9) Transportation infrastructure serving garrisons/deployment sites for<br />
mobile/moveable missiles (e.g., bridges, tunnel adits, rail choke points).<br />
(10) <strong>Air</strong>craft carriers <strong>and</strong> sea-based offensive missile <strong>and</strong> AMD platforms.<br />
c. Resources<br />
(1) Assets used to support OCA attack operations include fixed- <strong>and</strong> rotary-wing<br />
aircraft, CMs, SOF, other surface-to-surface fires, ground maneuver forces, EW <strong>and</strong> other IO<br />
capabilities, <strong>and</strong> ISR systems. Also, when required, long-range strike capabilities may be<br />
available to support the OCA effort.<br />
(2) Attack operations are highly dependent upon predictive <strong>and</strong> developed<br />
intelligence. Because of the difficulty in detecting highly mobile launch systems, a seamless<br />
network of C2 systems <strong>and</strong> sensors should be employed to share information <strong>and</strong> support<br />
NRT targeting <strong>and</strong> attack. National sensor systems normally will be required to augment<br />
theater air <strong>and</strong> surface based systems. Space systems provide tactical information to assist in<br />
determining enemy missile launch points <strong>and</strong> tracking. Additionally, intelligence collected<br />
by these systems can enable theater forces to anticipate hostile air <strong>and</strong> missile operations <strong>and</strong><br />
determine their unit locations.<br />
d. Execution. In addition to the JFACC’s own Service component forces, the JFC may<br />
apportion additional component force/capabilities to the JFACC to support theater-/JOAwide<br />
attack operations. The JFACC’s recommendation <strong>and</strong> the JFC’s decision on<br />
apportionment determine the amount of effort made available for OCA attack operations.<br />
Attack operations are generally planned against scheduled <strong>and</strong> on-call targets, but some<br />
flexibility must be planned for unanticipated/unplanned targets of opportunity.<br />
(1) Planned Scheduled Targets. Normally, OCA targets are nominated <strong>and</strong><br />
prioritized through the joint targeting process that results in planned targets; that may include<br />
a list of approved TSTs that must be attacked at the onset of hostilities, or even prior to the<br />
onset of hostilities. Typically, JFCs organize a joint targeting coordination board<br />
(JTCB) for determining apportionment of operational fires <strong>and</strong> shaping the operational<br />
environment in the theater/JOA, including fires supporting OCA attack operations.<br />
The JTCB normally simultaneously addresses at least three ATO cycles that are either being<br />
planned, about to be executed, or in execution.<br />
(2) Planned On-Call Targets. The quicker the joint force can locate, identify, <strong>and</strong><br />
target the enemy air <strong>and</strong> missile threats, the quicker they can be attacked <strong>and</strong> defeated. On-<br />
IV-10 <strong>JP</strong> 3-<strong>01</strong>