JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...
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Chapter V<br />
maritime forces in the execution of the AADP. Maritime assets assigned to DCA missions<br />
within the sphere of influence of a strike group comm<strong>and</strong>er will operate within the CWC<br />
structure. Maritime assets assigned to DCA missions outside of a strike group may be<br />
TACON to CTF IAMD. Planning for the AMD of maritime assets performing other<br />
missions outside of a strike group will be the responsibility of CTF IAMD.<br />
e. Interceptor <strong>Air</strong>craft. The AFFOR, NAVFOR, <strong>and</strong> MARFOR possess fixed-wing<br />
aircraft capable of an AD role. However, both the multi-role <strong>and</strong> air-to-air capable aircraft<br />
normally can be tasked against both DCA <strong>and</strong> OCA operations, dependent upon the JFC’s<br />
daily air apportionment decision.<br />
f. Other aircraft that are critical to DCA include the airborne C2, AR, signals<br />
intelligence, <strong>and</strong> EW aircraft.<br />
g. When operating with an MNF, a multitude of AMD capabilities (aircraft,<br />
interceptors, sensors, SAMs, ISR, <strong>and</strong> C2) from simple legacy to state-of-the-art is possible.<br />
Integration of those capabilities without creating a seam or hole in the AMD coverage is the<br />
challenge.<br />
h. In addition to EW, IO assets <strong>and</strong> procedures can be essential to DCA operations<br />
because of the critical reliance on electronic <strong>and</strong> computer systems for sensing, passing, <strong>and</strong><br />
displaying air <strong>and</strong> missile threat <strong>and</strong> defense information. Underst<strong>and</strong>ing that reliance, an<br />
enemy may attempt offensive IO against DCA assets.<br />
4. Integrated <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> Systems<br />
a. An IADS is not a formal system in itself but the aggregate of Service/functional<br />
component AMD systems comprising sensors, weapons, C2, communications, intelligence<br />
systems, <strong>and</strong> personnel operating in a theater/JOA under the comm<strong>and</strong> of an AADC.<br />
However, the IADS typically depends on support <strong>and</strong> enabling functions from national assets<br />
<strong>and</strong> systems not controlled by the JFC. Because the IADS is normally composed of different<br />
components, it requires significant integration <strong>and</strong> interoperability of communications <strong>and</strong><br />
TDL architectures to generate its expected synergistic effects for the JFC. An IADS requires<br />
planning that begins with organizing the AMD forces <strong>and</strong> determining comm<strong>and</strong><br />
relationships through the establishment of the COMNET for C2 of all the weapon systems<br />
integrated for DCA operations.<br />
b. To ensure counterair situational awareness <strong>and</strong> enable decision making, plans for an<br />
IADS must include the requirement for a reliable, consistent COP/CTP available in all major<br />
<strong>and</strong> supporting C2 facilities.<br />
c. The heart of the IADS is the integrated forces/capabilities controlled by, made<br />
available to, or in direct support of the AADC, <strong>and</strong> the actions planned <strong>and</strong> executed in<br />
accordance with the JFC’s AADP. Subject to the authority of the JFC, each component<br />
comm<strong>and</strong>er within a joint force does the following in support of DCA operations:<br />
(1) Coordinates <strong>and</strong> prioritizes their DCA operations <strong>and</strong> needs with the JFC <strong>and</strong><br />
other component comm<strong>and</strong>ers through the AADC.<br />
V-4 <strong>JP</strong> 3-<strong>01</strong>