JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Defense Counterair Planning and Operations
5. Early Engagement. Sensors and weapons are positioned to maximize
early warning and to engage and destroy aircraft and missiles before they acquire and fire on
or damage the defended asset.
6. Defense in Depth. AMD sensors and weapons are positioned to enable
multiple engagement opportunities and deliver an increasing volume of fire as an enemy air
or missile threat approaches the protected asset. Defense in depth reduces the probability
that “leakers” will reach the defended asset or force.
(c) Plan a MEZ. Proper sequencing in the establishment of WEZs is critical
to an effective IADS and DCA operations. MEZs established for surface defense are based
on specific boundaries and weapons system capabilities. For the organic SAM capability of
a surface force, the MEZ boundaries should be within the component AO, and for direct
support the MEZ should cover the defended asset/area. The MEZ area should be large
enough to allow early engagement of threats: ASM launch platforms should be destroyed or
neutralized before they can launch standoff munitions, UA before they reach sensor/weapon
range of defended assets, and BMs prior to maneuver or submunitions release. To the
maximum extent possible, all targets should have multiple, layered engagement opportunities
to ensure an effective defense. The AADP, ACMs, and SPINS should specify what targets
can be engaged in the MEZ and the weapons to be used.
(d) Consider the fact that maritime forces are not “static” and they usually
employ a “moving MEZ” with separate operational areas for air operations. In a littoral
environment, amphibious operations may encompass a portion of the land AO and function
as a MEZ. In this case, maritime combatants may be restricted by geography when
defending selected coastal assets. Linking land-based SAM systems with maritime force
generated search and fire control data and vice versa can result in improved ability to defend
the littoral areas.
(e) Determine Surface-Based Defenses C2 Coverage and Fire Control.
DCA operations depend upon effective and redundant C2 planning. The IADS should
integrate the ground- and sea-based C2 nodes, airborne C2 platforms, and the surface force
AD fire direction centers. As a minimum, the following is required:
architecture.
1. Designate RADCs/SADCs as required and incorporate into the IADS
2. Specify required data links between C2 nodes and forces.
3. Designate primary and secondary C2 centers for all active AMD forces.
4. Align control centers with their operational forces whenever possible.
5. Establish an intelligence and warning architecture; ensure remote units
and separate forces are addressed.
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