JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

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Combat Identification a. ID Matrix Use Versus Implementation of TDL Track ID/Classification. Track ID/classification data shared over a TDL may not support the CID process. Planners must consider how the IDs are determined and entered into the track ID/classification system (e.g., a TDL) that portrays a particular track throughout the C2 systems. The JICO cell planners should provide a list of ID classifications (e.g., unknown, friendly, hostile, neutral) to be used on the TDL. (1) The ID matrix must take into consideration the limitations inherent in the employed systems that will implement the ID procedures. Once the set of track symbols is determined, the use of terminology for these symbols must be aligned. Each JFC should have ID criteria that include brevity code terms. For example, pay particular attention to the “bandit” codeword versus the system track symbol for “hostile.” An enemy aircraft with a TDL tracking symbol for hostile could be called a “bandit” (ID as enemy not authorized to engage) or called a “hostile” (ID as enemy with authority to engage). The AADC should ensure only those specific voice brevity terms approved by the JFC for authority to engage are used throughout the CID process. (2) Build the ID matrix to the lowest common denominator, that is, what everyone can classify/transmit/receive/forward to support the shooter. This will reduce the risk of missed targets and fratricide. b. ID Criteria. ID criteria are used for application of ROE. The ROE supports CID criteria for an engagement decision dependent upon weapon systems capabilities. The AADC is responsible for recommending DCA ROE and developing ID and engagement criteria for JFC approval in the AADP, with specific instructions in the ATO and/or SPINS. c. Positive ID Methods (1) IFF Modes (1-5 per the ATO/SPINS). (2) PPLI. (3) A radar contact correlated with an authenticated/secure voice (position) report from an air or ground control agency. (4) External/onboard CID systems (e.g., blue force tracker or noncooperative target recognition). (5) Visual ID. d. Positive ID Considerations (1) Positive ID is an ID derived from visual observation and/or electronic systems, possibly combined with other factors (e.g., point of origin), with a higher confidence of accuracy than a simple lack of friend or lack of enemy. Positive ID criteria, as established by the commander’s ROE, are a basis for CID for engagement (shoot/no-shoot) decisions, so it is useable for ID for airspace control and AD tracking. When available, positive ID is used because it provides the most rapid, reliable, and transferable means of ID. Most enemy A-3
Appendix A positive hostile IDs are derived from technology-based ID systems that exploit the physical or electronic characteristics of a target (e.g., noncooperative target recognition, signals intelligence, or electronic support measures). (2) Not all CID participants may see the same ID-related information. This is dependent primarily on system implementation, J-series versus M-series message standards, and operator display capabilities. Because of the different implementation of TDL messages, planners should consider limiting the number of track classification symbols to reduce confusion and the potential for fratricide. e. Figure A-1 provides a sample ID matrix for tracks. For a detailed discussion of CID in an IADS, refer to FM 3-01.15/MCRP 3-25E/NTTP 3- 01.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System. A-4 JP 3-01
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Joint Publication 3-01 Countering A
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Preface Intentionally Blank ii JP 3
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Summary of Changes Intentionally Bl
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Table of Contents Section A. Intell
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Table of Contents III-2 Formation A
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Executive Summary defend itself. Sy
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Executive Summary • Designate an
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Executive Summary Cross Area of Res
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Executive Summary the JFC, are the
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Executive Summary of separate MNF C
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Executive Summary Defensive Counter
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Executive Summary air-, and sea bas
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Chapter I (1) Air Superiority. Air
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Chapter I (b) Suppression of Enemy
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Chapter I (2) Establishing and moni
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Chapter I and surrounding territori
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Chapter I Intentionally Blank I-10
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Chapter II TACON while surface-base
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Chapter II (6) Establish, coordinat
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Chapter II some of the functions of
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Chapter II and air operations with
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Chapter II integration, and deconfl
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Chapter II (11) Make OCA attack ope
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Chapter II atmospheric) BM engageme
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Chapter II authority down to a RADC
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Chapter II Factors Affecting the Mi
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Chapter II including considerations
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Chapter II unit commander/JFLCC on
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Chapter II (6) Joint Interface Cont
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Chapter II all echelons to achieve
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Chapter II JFACC/AADC and authorize
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Chapter III making process, the JIP
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Chapter III Details regarding the J
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Chapter III Principles for Planning
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Chapter III (6) Procedures to exped
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Chapter III c. During forcible entr
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Chapter III minimizing duplication
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Chapter III scenarios, but generall
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Chapter III 13. Identification, Com
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Chapter III enemy (i.e., low confid
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Chapter III 17. Critical Asset List
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Chapter III (a) Level 1. Level 1 pr
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Chapter III and take advantage of r
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Chapter III commercial, and request
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Page 91 and 92: Chapter IV threads that tie all joi
Page 93 and 94: Chapter IV (7) Assessment—the abi
Page 95 and 96: Chapter IV special operations, and
Page 97 and 98: Chapter IV SECTION B. OFFENSIVE COU
Page 99 and 100: Chapter IV (5) Major IADS C2 facili
Page 101 and 102: Chapter IV Refer to JP 3-60, Joint
Page 103 and 104: Chapter IV protect specific operati
Page 105 and 106: Chapter IV (2) An air support reque
Page 107 and 108: Chapter IV 10. Fighter Sweep a. The
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Page 111 and 112: Chapter V (1) Centralized Planning
Page 113 and 114: Chapter V maritime forces in the ex
Page 115 and 116: Chapter V impact the theater-wide J
Page 117 and 118: Chapter V 1. Tracks not updating/tr
Page 119 and 120: Chapter V (2) DCA Estimate. Planner
Page 121 and 122: Chapter V (b) Point Defense. Point
Page 123 and 124: Chapter V 6. Delegate necessary aut
Page 125 and 126: Chapter V 1. DCA fighter aircraft a
Page 127 and 128: Chapter V (5) Firing Doctrine. Guid
Page 129 and 130: Chapter V (3) The likelihood and ti
Page 131 and 132: Chapter V (d) Chemical, Biological,
Page 133 and 134: Chapter V annihilation, AD aircraft
Page 135 and 136: Chapter V multitude of targets, som
Page 137 and 138: Chapter V Intentionally Blank V-28
Page 139: Appendix A e. Electronic methods pr
Page 143 and 144: Appendix A Intentionally Blank A-6
Page 145 and 146: Appendix B (3) Describe BM defense
Page 147 and 148: Appendix B ANNEXES: (List of notion
Page 149 and 150: Appendix B Enclosure 1: References
Page 151 and 152: Appendix C terrain and air avenues
Page 153 and 154: Appendix C (5) Passive and active D
Page 155 and 156: Appendix D b. Manufacturing. Countr
Page 157 and 158: Appendix D 45 minutes and relocated
Page 159 and 160: Appendix D 4. Cruise Missiles a. A
Page 161 and 162: Appendix D infrastructure, logistic
Page 163 and 164: Appendix D Gulf War The initial hop
Page 165 and 166: Appendix E terrestrial services. Th
Page 167 and 168: Appendix E supporting commander, ba
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Page 171 and 172: Appendix E under attack, and the ti
Page 173 and 174: Appendix E development, testing, an
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Page 177 and 178: Appendix F m. JP 3-27, Homeland Def
Page 179 and 180: Appendix G 6. Distribution of Elect
Page 181 and 182: Glossary C2 CAL CAP CAS CBRN CCDR C
Page 183 and 184: Glossary JFC JFCC-IMD JFLCC JFMCC J
Page 185 and 186: Glossary TACS TAGS TAOC TDL TEL TGM
Page 187 and 188: Glossary air defense direction cent
Page 189 and 190: Glossary combat air patrol. An airc
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Glossary flight advisory. None. (Ap
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Glossary employed to engage air thr
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Glossary radar netting unit. None.
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Glossary been identified. (Approved
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