JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

Chapter II
authority down to a RADC/SADC. The air and missile threats posed by adversaries are
normally known, and plans/orders, including ROE, are approved in anticipation of the
indications and warnings that would precede a possible hostile launch.
d. Existing plans and orders address a number of known cross-AOR threats. A
primary concern involving cross-AOR fires/operations is the potential difficulty of
prioritizing tactical actions of a supporting unit. Support relationships between GCCs
can be clearly established, but responding to conflicting requirements or priorities can create
an operational dilemma: How does the unit commander respond to multiple tasks? When
may there be conflicting times and locations? This type of situation should be mitigated
through exercises and rehearsals.
e. Other essential considerations in cross-AOR BMD are differences in GCCs plans and
procedures, command relationships, and battle management procedures. For example,
command relationships and the engagement procedures for homeland BMD are
significantly different than those for other regional BMD. These differences can be
overcome through prior planning, training, and rehearsals among the supported and
supporting commanders and tasked units. This applies to both the offensive and defensive
aspects of a missile defense strategy.
11. General
SECTION B. MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Most joint operations are now conducted within a multinational context (i.e., an alliance
or coalition). Each MNF operation is unique, and the international situation, along with the
perspectives, motives, and values of each MNF member may vary. The JFC (who may be
the multinational force commander [MNFC]) must evaluate key considerations and
differences involved in planning, coordinating, and conducting counterair operations in a
multinational environment. A major characteristic of operating in the multinational
environment is that consensus through compromise is often essential to success. Within
designated command authorities and in close coordination with the civilian leadership, the
MNFC may have responsibilities to both national and foreign leaders and must be prepared
to negotiate with MNF partners when planning and developing ROE, ACMs, weapon control
measures, and other appropriate procedures and processes such as CID.
12. Command Relationships
a. The traditional command relationships used by US forces generally may not be
possible with all MNF partners because of political necessity. Some MNF partners may
accept US command authorities; others may not. In MNF operations, understanding the
agreed upon command relationships and the related command authorities is key to
developing the desired unity of effort for counterair operations.
b. If command relationships and support requirements (e.g., security and logistics) are
not already provided for in existing agreements, the JFC should request to have such
agreements concluded (memorandums of agreements, technical arrangements, status of
forces agreements, etc.) between US and MNF members conducting counterair operations.
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