JP 3-01 Countering Air and Missile Threats - Defense Innovation ...

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Defense Counterair Planning and Operations 2. Unit Security/Counter-Surveillance. Local unit security is an important element in denying accurate targeting data to enemy SOF or other enemy agents. Patrolling and ground forces support is important to keep enemy threat forces of Level I (agents, saboteurs, and terrorists) and Level II (small tactical units) from conducting harassment or interdiction attacks against DCA assets. 3. Nighttime Support Operations. Consider nighttime for conducting time-consuming resupply or other operations that could highlight units’ visibility and increase their vulnerability. 4. Camouflage and Concealment. Practice visual signature reduction measures that can “hide” or deny accuracy in locating friendly targets/target systems. These measures may be conducted continuously or in response to specific warnings. Timely intelligence concerning the overflight by enemy satellite and aircraft collection systems is important to the effort. Those measures also may be coupled with deception measures to further complicate chances of effective enemy attacks. The employment of obscurants can negate the effectiveness and accuracy of attack threats during DCA operations. Refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, for additional discussion regarding OPSEC. Refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, for more details regarding deception operations. (3) Reducing Vulnerability. There are four measures that may enable friendly assets to survive enemy attacks by reducing their vulnerability. (a) Hardening. Valuable assets and their shelters are hardened to protect against physical attack, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and transient radiation. Hardening measures should be accomplished during peacetime whenever possible. Hardening reduces the effect of attack on systems and facilities (i.e., aircraft, missiles, air base support equipment and facilities, nuclear delivery systems, nuclear storage areas, C2 facilities, communications nodes, and logistic facilities). When EMP hardening is not feasible, an EMP vulnerability assessment should be made to identify suitable preparatory and defensive measures. (b) Redundancy. A principal means of preserving combat power is duplication of critical nodes, capabilities, and systems that are particularly vulnerable to air and missile attack and for which other passive measures may be less appropriate. Redundancy includes dual, contingency, or backup capabilities that can assume primary mission functions (in whole or in part) upon failure or degradation of the primary system. Of primary concern are “soft” targets such as C2 nodes and sensors (antenne) and fixed sites such as airfields and ground stations for airborne sensors. (c) Dispersal. Dispersal reduces target vulnerability by decreasing concentration and making a target system less lucrative. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases enemy uncertainty as to whether a particular location is occupied and, if so, whether it will be occupied when the attack is executed. V-21
Chapter V (d) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Equipment and Facilities. CBRN defensive equipment and facilities protect against the effects of CBRN hazards by providing contamination detection, shelter, and decontamination. Individual protective equipment allows vital functions to continue in the CBRN environment and to minimize effects of WMD attacks. See JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, for further details regarding protection and operations in a CBRN environment. (4) Recovery and Reconstitution. Following an air or missile attack, units should be restored to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. Resources should be made available to restore capabilities in accordance with JFC established priorities. Recovery and reconstitution after a WMD attack will require special planning considerations, as improper handling of CBRN casualties and contaminated material and equipment may impact other activities. d. Resources for Passive AD. The components of the joint force bring unique capabilities to the different aspects of passive AMD. Engineers, CBRN defense and decontamination experts, explosive ordnance disposal personnel, and medical units may contribute significantly to passive AD efforts. A threat-based risk analysis, distributing area responsibilities, and establishing support tasks are factors that impact AMD. Some MNF members may specialize in passive AD capabilities. HN support and civilian infrastructure may augment or enhance joint force recovery efforts, either through government coordinated action or contracted support. It is essential that these capabilities, when available, are planned and integrated into the total passive AMD capability. e. Execution of Passive Air Defenses (1) Responsibilities. The AADC and chain of command are responsible for timely warning of attacks. Component commanders and their forces have delegated responsibilities to ensure passive AD measures are planned and executed in a timely manner down to the unit level. (a) As a minimum, the AADC must be able to pass warnings directly to the joint force Service and functional component commands, and if applicable, establish procedures to pass warnings to and from HN authorities. BM warnings generally will originate from the theater event system. Airborne threat warnings generally are issued through the C2 system (e.g., RADC/SADC). Local commanders may declare local ADW based on the local threat. (b) Component commanders establish and maintain communications links down to the lowest unit level. (c) Cross-component support is a unit and component commanders’ responsibility. Cross-component support may establish connectivity to geographically isolated units of other Services or MNF units that are unable to link within their parent organizations. V-22 JP 3-01
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Joint Publication 3-01 Countering A
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Preface Intentionally Blank ii JP 3
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Summary of Changes Intentionally Bl
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Table of Contents Section A. Intell
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Table of Contents III-2 Formation A
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Executive Summary defend itself. Sy
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Executive Summary • Designate an
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Executive Summary Cross Area of Res
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Executive Summary the JFC, are the
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Executive Summary of separate MNF C
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Executive Summary Defensive Counter
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Executive Summary air-, and sea bas
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Chapter I (1) Air Superiority. Air
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Chapter I (b) Suppression of Enemy
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Chapter I (2) Establishing and moni
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Chapter I and surrounding territori
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Chapter I Intentionally Blank I-10
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Chapter II TACON while surface-base
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Chapter II (6) Establish, coordinat
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Chapter II some of the functions of
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Chapter II and air operations with
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Chapter II integration, and deconfl
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Chapter II (11) Make OCA attack ope
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Chapter II atmospheric) BM engageme
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Chapter II authority down to a RADC
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Chapter II Factors Affecting the Mi
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Chapter II including considerations
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Chapter II unit commander/JFLCC on
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Chapter II (6) Joint Interface Cont
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Chapter II all echelons to achieve
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Chapter II JFACC/AADC and authorize
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Chapter III making process, the JIP
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Chapter III Details regarding the J
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Chapter III Principles for Planning
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Chapter III (6) Procedures to exped
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Chapter III c. During forcible entr
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Chapter III minimizing duplication
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Chapter III scenarios, but generall
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Chapter III 13. Identification, Com
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Page 111 and 112: Chapter V (1) Centralized Planning
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Page 119 and 120: Chapter V (2) DCA Estimate. Planner
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Page 127 and 128: Chapter V (5) Firing Doctrine. Guid
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Page 139 and 140: Appendix A e. Electronic methods pr
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Page 145 and 146: Appendix B (3) Describe BM defense
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Page 149 and 150: Appendix B Enclosure 1: References
Page 151 and 152: Appendix C terrain and air avenues
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Page 161 and 162: Appendix D infrastructure, logistic
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Page 177 and 178: Appendix F m. JP 3-27, Homeland Def
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Glossary C2 CAL CAP CAS CBRN CCDR C
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Glossary JFC JFCC-IMD JFLCC JFMCC J
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Glossary TACS TAGS TAOC TDL TEL TGM
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Glossary air defense direction cent
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Glossary combat air patrol. An airc
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Glossary flight advisory. None. (Ap
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Glossary employed to engage air thr
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Glossary radar netting unit. None.
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Glossary been identified. (Approved
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