PDF(2.7mb) - 國家政策研究基金會

More documents

Recommendations

Info

118 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009 Conclusion Quite clearly, there is no agreement on how to amend the Assembly and Demonstration Act. The fundamental difference is whether to remove all control or to keep part of it. Civil rights advocates and parliamentarians are more liberal, insisting that all that is necessary for voters to take to the streets is to give the law enforcement authorities their “voluntary notification.” The government is conservative and wants “coercive notification” of organizers so that the police may veto any assembly or demonstration at their own discretion, whereas no veto power is available under the “voluntary notification” mechanism. Freedom of expression is the core consideration of all proponents of the amendment except the Executive Yuan. In terms of freedom of speech, the amendment versions proposed by the civic bodies and the lawmakers leave more room for people to speak out through their public meetings for organizers are not liable to punishment. As a matter of fact, organizers are convinced it is no crime to rally for a cause even if that may cause the police and the public some trouble. On the other hand, the government version is not quite in line with freedom to speech. The government wants organizers to inform the police of their public meetings in advance and the police can still ban the meetings or modify the meeting schedules. If the police do so, the organizers have no way to ask for a review of the police decisions. coercive notification mechanism to lighten the burden on the police, who will be made better able to handle any contingencies arising from more assemblies and demonstrations. Although each version is a trade-off between freedom of expression and police workload, the one proposed by the Executive Yuan might be a realistic balance between the stance of the police, the expectation of the public, and the intention of President Ma Ying-jeou who promised a revamping of the act adopted in 1988. The overhaul is clearly stated in his white paper on human rights issued while he was campaigning for president. Though the voluntary notification mechanism has bipartisan support in the Legislative Yuan, it may not be passed with ease. Among legislators, this act is too controversial to summon agreement from the significant stakeholders in the near future. However, the Executive branch traditionally has the capability of swaying public opinion on a political agenda, which, in turn, may influence the voting in the Legislative Yuan. If the Kuomintang, which controls a virtual three-fourths majority in the legislature, decides to throw full support behind its administration, the act to be finally adopted may be a conservative and restrictive one. Whether President Ma will approve of the conservative act or try to exert his influence over Kuomintang lawmakers to go against their party line remains to be seen The heavy workload of the police is the major concern of the Executive Yuan, albeit it is not a key issue to all other proponents. Their versions, if adopted, may make it easier for people to march in protest, further increasing the heavy workload of the police and the chances of their clashes with protesting crowds. When violence occurs in clashes, the police are inevitably criticized. If they do not control the rowdy, the police are damned for “being too soft” on violence-prone members of the crowd. If they repress the rowdy in force, they are condemned for police brutality. It is understandable that the government wants to adopt the
Exercise of the Powers of Examination and Control 119 Exercise of the Powers of Examination and Control KAO, Yuang-kuang Abstract The Constitution of the Republic of China provides for a central government with five Yuans, each of which exercises a government power. Two of them are unique. They are the Control Yuan that is the nation’s highest watchdog body exercising the power of control, and the Examination Yuan that exercises the power of examination, responsible for the examination, employment, and management of all civil service personnel. The powers of control and examination were created in addition to the traditional three-power system of government in the West by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese republic. During the past eight years, however, former President Chen Shui-bian materially interfered in the exercise of the examination and control powers, infringing on the neutrality of bureaucracy and forcing the Control Yuan to fall into abeyance. President Ma Ying-jeou, who succeeded Chem, insists on neutrality in the process of nomination for candidates to form the new Control and Examination Yuan. Such an insistence to uphold his political idealism bruised Ma in the inauguration of the two yuan in 2008. Key Words: examination power, control power, Chen Shui-bian, party inclination.
Page 1 and 2:
CONTENTS Preface Overview ix xi Foc
Page 3:
Agriculture and Fisheries Impact of
Page 6 and 7:
CHUANG, Yih-chyi( 莊奕琦 ) Pro
Page 8 and 9:
TAN, Ching-yu( 譚瑾瑜 ) Associ
Page 10 and 11:
enth effort on the part of the Foun
Page 12 and 13:
ills pertinent to parliamentary ref
Page 14 and 15:
xiv
Page 16 and 17:
2 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2
Page 18 and 19:
Page 20 and 21:
Page 22 and 23:
Page 24 and 25:
10 Taiwan Development Perspectives
Page 26 and 27:
Page 28 and 29:
Page 30 and 31:
Page 32 and 33:
Page 34 and 35:
Page 36 and 37:
Page 38 and 39:
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83: 68 Taiwan Development Perspectives
Page 182 and 183:
Page 184 and 185:
Page 186 and 187:
Page 188 and 189:
Page 190 and 191:
Page 192 and 193:
Page 194 and 195:
Page 196 and 197:
Page 198 and 199:
Page 200 and 201:
Page 202 and 203:
Page 204 and 205:
Page 206 and 207:
Page 208 and 209:
Page 210 and 211:
Page 212 and 213:
Page 214 and 215:
Page 216 and 217:
Page 218 and 219:
Page 220 and 221:
Page 222 and 223:
Page 224 and 225:
Page 226 and 227:
Page 228 and 229:
Page 230 and 231:
Page 232 and 233:
Page 234 and 235:
Page 236 and 237:
Page 238 and 239:
Page 240 and 241:
Page 242 and 243:
Page 244 and 245:
Page 246 and 247:
Page 248 and 249:
Page 250 and 251:
Page 252 and 253:
Page 254 and 255:
Page 256 and 257:
Page 258 and 259:
Page 260 and 261:
Page 262 and 263:
Page 264 and 265:
Page 266 and 267:
Page 268 and 269:
Page 270 and 271:
Page 272 and 273:
Page 274 and 275:
Page 276 and 277:
Page 278 and 279:
Page 280 and 281:
Page 282 and 283:
Page 284 and 285:
Page 286 and 287:
Page 288 and 289:
Page 290 and 291:
Page 292 and 293:
Page 294 and 295:
Page 296 and 297:
Page 298 and 299:
Page 300 and 301:
Page 302 and 303:
show all

PDF(2.7mb) - 國家政策研究基金會

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?