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176 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009 to conquer Taiwan. Another argument against large-scale amphibious operations is that they are not necessary, because massive missile attacks, coupled with an effective blockade, can easily drain Taiwan’s fighting capabilities, cut off its energy supply, and start an island-wide stampede of war refugees. Taiwan simply has to sue for peace. The PLAN is more than able to play its role in that scenario. China has built up an arsenal of advanced comprehensive ballistic missiles. It is capable of launching air-to-surface, surface-to-surface and underwater long range anti-ship missiles with the guidance of the space-based surveillance and positioning system. It certainly poses a thought-provoking challenge to possible U.S. naval intervention in hostilities across the Taiwan Strait. In the meantime, China’s military buildup is going on apace. Beijing needs enough power to deter or delay U.S. and Japanese naval intervention in the cross-strait armed conflict. China also hopes a greater tilt in the cross-strait military balance in its favor would compel Taiwan to abandon its resolution to resist. Then the use of force becomes unnecessary. 1. Territorial Integrity China and Japan are engaged in a dispute over the overlapping exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea. The Republic of China, the People’s Republic and Southeast Asian countries claim sovereignty over three archipelagoes in the South China Sea. While all parties to the disputes are agreed that the issue of sovereignty must be shelved to get joint development of undersea oil reserves under way, the People’s Republic does not yield on the question of territorial integrity. The Spratly Islands, the largest of the three archipelagoes, are most controversial. These islets are claimed by the Republic of China, the People’s Republic, the Federation of Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam 14 and the Philippines. 15 Beijing wants to control the Spratlys and the South China Sea, where sea lanes of Japan, Korea and other Asian nations converge. Beijing is doing what it can to protect its strategic assets in the South China Sea. The PLAN is charged with the missions to operate in the open sea to defend China’s exclusive economic zones and to safeguard sovereignty over all three island groups. The People’s Republic is reported to have completed what it calls “the third generation buildup” 16 on Mischief Island of the Spratlys. The PLAN has held a number of counter-landing exercises. China has also set up facilities on other uninhabited islets to monitor radio communications among neighboring countries. In addition, the PLAN has expanded an airport on one of the Paracels to serve SU-30 fighter planes. A very large military harbor was opened at the southern tip of Hainan Island. The new naval base is located in Yalon Bay near Sanya. 17 China’s State Council approved the founding of the city of Sansha in October 2007. The new city on Hainan Island has jurisdiction over the three South China Looks beyond Taiwan? 14 Vietnam is the only country that claims exclusive sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. See State Ocean Bureau website on March 12 in 2008. China patrols waters off the archipelago to claim sovereignty by a show of force. 15 Six reefs were under Chinese control at the end of 1991. The Republic of China stations a garrison on Taiping Island (Itu Aba). Forty-four reefs were occupied by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. 16 China in Spratly Islands extension military installation, Washington VOA, November 20,2008 17 China’s Naval Secrets, Asian Wall Street Journal, by Richard Fisher, Jr. Published on May 5th, 2008.
PLAN Looks beyond Taiwan 177 China Sea archipelagoes of the Paracels, Spratlys, and the Macclesfield Bank. 18 In November 2008, the South China Sea Fleet sent a 071 amphibious transport dock and a 052C destroyer as a task group on a patrol mission. The group patrolled the Pratas Islands, Macclesfied Bank, and the Spratlys. It arrived at James Shoal, where a boundary mark of the People’s Republic was submerged. 19 2 . Importance of Sea Lanes China consumes approximately 7.58 million barrels of oil per day. By 2015 the daily consumption will rise to 10-12 million barrels. The People’s Republic has been the world’s third largest importer of oil and second largest consumer since 2003. Over 53 percent of oil is imported and shipped through the Malacca or Lombok Straits. The two straits are most important maritime highways or segments of international shipping routes for energy and other resources. 20 Increased dependence on overseas resources will bring Beijing to exert a greater effort by Chinese naval forces to protect the trade flow and show the flag in ports of countries that are considered important trading partners. "The oceans are our lifelines. If commerce were cut off, the economy would plummet," says Ni Lexiong, a fellow at the Shanghai National Defense Institute and an outspoken proponent 18 On October 26 Wenchang municipal party committee secretary Xie Min disclosed that Hainan will have the new city of Sansha. China Times, Nov. 21, 2007 19 See www.wforum.com, Dec. 10 2008, “A 052C guide missile destroyer has put a sovereignty monument under James Shoal.” 20 As China Grows So Does Its Long Neglected Navy, GORDON FAIRCLOUGH Article, JULY 16, 2007, WSJ, of Chinese sea power. "We need a strong navy," he adds. 21 China’s naval construction plan indicates that the PLAN will be called upon to protect the SLOC in the next few years and to keep open the checkpoints relevant to China's trade flow. SLOC defense falls under four categories: coastal, regional, inter-regional, and global defense. Coastal SLOC defense is solid. First priority is given the security of the South China Sea to ensure regional SLOC defense. The Yalong Bay naval base can accommodate three or four nuclear submarines in the future. The PLAN has assigned all their new missile destroyers to the South Sea Fleet to strengthen its air defense capability. 22 The combat radius of land-based fighters has been lengthened, the aim being to let the fleet carry out missions of commanding the sea without the air coverage from the land. The PLAN is now capable of carrying out regional SLOC defense or South China Sea SLOC protection. But if China wants to conduct checkpoint defense in the South China Sea, 23 the PLAN must be more powerful than all Southeast Asian navies combined and cope with Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Indian Navy. The PLAN has yet to acquire that much power. Inter-regional SLOC defense, which entails the keeping of security along the sea lanes from China to the Persian Gulf with a distance of 5,500 nautical miles, is a tremendous job. It entails development of an ocean-going fleet matching that of the JMSDF or the Indian Navy and acquisition of a series of overseas bases. The job can be done only if China earmarks an 21 As China Grows So Does Its Long Neglected Navy, GORDON FAIRCLOUGH Article, JULY 16, 2007 WSJ, 22 See Kanwa News, July 30, 2005. 23 Such as the Malacca Strait, Lombok Strait and Sunda Strait.
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CONTENTS Preface Overview ix xi Foc
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Agriculture and Fisheries Impact of
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CHUANG, Yih-chyi( 莊奕琦 ) Pro
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TAN, Ching-yu( 譚瑾瑜 ) Associ
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enth effort on the part of the Foun
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ills pertinent to parliamentary ref
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