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The Foreign and Cross-Strait Policies of the New AdministrationIn the Republic of China 153
no’s: no contact, no negotiations, and no compromise,
until President Chiang Ching-kuo decided in September
1987 to allow veterans to visit the mainland for family
reunions. Prior to this, world politics had already
changed; on December 15, 1978, the US abruptly declared
that it would switch diplomatic recognition from
Taipei to Beijing on January 1, 1979. Taipei had to bite
the bullet.
The Changing Relationship across the Taiwan
Strait
Chiang Ching-kuo’s decision to allow army veterans
to visit the mainland was far-reaching in its impact.
Other citizens followed the veterans to the mainland for
trade, investment, and tourism, with the government
looking the other way. The exchanges increased so rapidly
that in l992 both sides of the Strait sensed the need
to hold talks for resolving emerging issues. As governments
on both sides did not, as they still do not, recognize
each other, proxy organizations had to be set up to
conduct the talks.
In the government structure, a separate cabinet-level
agency handling mainland affairs, called the
Mainland Affairs Council, was established. Under this
agency, a proxy organization, the Straits Exchange
Foundation, a non-profit corporation, was set up. Its
counterpart, ARATS, the Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Strait, was also set up. The Legislative
Yuan enacted a law titled “Statute Governing Relations
of People across the Taiwan Strait.” We do not
stamp visas on PRC passports, but issue a separate
booklet titled “Permit for Mainland Compatriots to Visit
Taiwan. Likewise, the PRC does not stamp visas on
ROC passports and also issue similar booklets.
For the purpose of a preliminary meeting, the two
proxy organizations sent delegations to Hong Kong for
a first-ever meeting in October 1992. They immediately
hit snags over the definition of “One China.” For
us, it is the Republic of China, and both Taiwan and the
mainland constitute China. For them, it is the People’s
Republic of China, and Taiwan is part of China. Finally,
both sides agreed that, having respectively stated their
interpretations, they should shelve the issue and proceed
to the formal business talks in the future. That in
essence was the “Consensus of 1992.” Indeed, the
principals of the two organizations, C. F. Koo and
Wang Taohan, were able to meet for talks in April 1993
in Singapore. Four minor agreements were signed. Parity
and dignity for both sides were meticulously observed
at the meeting.
A second meeting for Koo and Wang was scheduled
for late 1995 in Taipei, but plans miscarried because
of President Lee Teng-hui’s trip to the United
States to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, was
considered provocative by the PRC. The year 1996
witnessed an unfortunate missile crisis across the Strait.
After the ROC government assured the world that
cross-Strait relations had not changed, Koo was finally
able to visit Wang in Shanghai in 1998, but not for
talks.
Further exchanges were aborted following Lee
Teng-hui’s “special state-to-state relationship” statement
of July 1999 and his successor Chen Shui-bian’s
pro-independence utterances and moves. Tensions
mounted to such a point that the PRC enacted a law,
titled “Anti-Secession Act” in March 2005. To reduce
tension, Lien Chan, then chairman of the Kuomintang
(KMT) Party, went to Beijing in April/May on a Journey
of Peace at the invitation of Hu Jintao, General
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The KMT was in opposition then, so the two leaders
issued only a joint vision statement on April 29,
2005, which could be summarized as follows:
(1) Resumption of talks on the basis of parity and the
1992 consensus;
(2) Reaching a peace agreement, including the establishment
of a confidence-building mechanism;
(3) Promoting full-scale economic cooperation across
the Strait, leading eventually to a cross-Strait common
market;