PDF(2.7mb) - 國家政策研究基金會
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128 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009<br />
The following table shows the results.<br />
Total Eligible Valid Votes<br />
Voters Yes No<br />
Invalid<br />
Votes<br />
Total Votes<br />
Voting<br />
Rates<br />
Approval<br />
17,313,854 4,962,309 724,060 500,749 6,187,118 35.74% No<br />
5. Analysis<br />
Much less than half of the electorate showed up to<br />
vote on any of the four referendums. The Kuomintang<br />
has a larger power base than the Democratic Progressive<br />
Party. On the other hand, voters also voted at their<br />
own discretion. However, the following factors affected<br />
the voting on the referendums.<br />
a. Appeal to voters not to vote<br />
Lien Chan, honorary Kuomintang chairman, appealed<br />
to supporters to go to the polls to “pick up two<br />
ballots and cast one for a candidate and the other for the<br />
party but forget about the other two ballots.” In other<br />
words, Lien asked supporters to elect a new Legislative<br />
Yuan (the two ballots to elect regional lawmakers and<br />
those at large) but told them not to vote on the two referendums,<br />
one of them sponsored by the Kuomintang.<br />
(Liberty Times/page A4, Jan. 1, 2008) Lien is the spiritual<br />
leader of the Kuomintang. His appeal was heeded.<br />
b. High threshold<br />
Kuomintang supporters knew the best way to reject<br />
the referendums is to refuse to vote so that the turnout<br />
would be lower than a simple majority. So they<br />
stayed away. Supporters of the Democratic Progressive<br />
Party also knew it full well. As a consequence, many of<br />
them did not show up to vote on the referendums, convinced<br />
that their attendance made little difference.<br />
c. Unattractive agenda<br />
Voters fully realized that, even if the referendums<br />
were adopted, none of them would be put into effect.<br />
They knew it did not matter whether they voted or did<br />
not vote.<br />
d. Marginal utility<br />
Voters understood their marginal utility was diminishing.<br />
III. Linkage of Referendums and Elections<br />
in 2008<br />
Referendums are held alongside major elections in<br />
many countries. For example, 153 referendums were<br />
held in 36 states in the United States when the presidential<br />
election was held in 2008.<br />
It is stipulated in Article 24 of the Referendum<br />
Law that the Central Election Commission shall hold a<br />
referendum within one to six months after its proposal<br />
is approved and made public. The referendum may be<br />
held alongside a national election.<br />
However, President Chen Shui-bian called the two<br />
“defensive” referendums in accordance with Article 17<br />
of the Referendum Law alongside the presidential election<br />
of 2004. He won, because of the large turnout following<br />
the shooting incident on the eve of the election.<br />
The Kuomintang was convinced that the election<br />
cum referendums, along with the shooting incident, was<br />
the cause of the loss of its presidential candidate Lien<br />
Chan. John C. Kuan, the then vice chairman of the<br />
Kuomintang, concluded after comparing the vote tabulations:<br />
“The two defensive referendums were the key to<br />
the presidential election (of 2004). In all counties and<br />
cities, our party had lower voter support when more<br />
voters voted on the referendums. For example, more<br />
than 50 percent of voters – higher than the national average<br />
of 45 percent – voted on the referendums in Yilan