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PDF(2.7mb) - 國家政策研究基金會

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128 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009<br />

The following table shows the results.<br />

Total Eligible Valid Votes<br />

Voters Yes No<br />

Invalid<br />

Votes<br />

Total Votes<br />

Voting<br />

Rates<br />

Approval<br />

17,313,854 4,962,309 724,060 500,749 6,187,118 35.74% No<br />

5. Analysis<br />

Much less than half of the electorate showed up to<br />

vote on any of the four referendums. The Kuomintang<br />

has a larger power base than the Democratic Progressive<br />

Party. On the other hand, voters also voted at their<br />

own discretion. However, the following factors affected<br />

the voting on the referendums.<br />

a. Appeal to voters not to vote<br />

Lien Chan, honorary Kuomintang chairman, appealed<br />

to supporters to go to the polls to “pick up two<br />

ballots and cast one for a candidate and the other for the<br />

party but forget about the other two ballots.” In other<br />

words, Lien asked supporters to elect a new Legislative<br />

Yuan (the two ballots to elect regional lawmakers and<br />

those at large) but told them not to vote on the two referendums,<br />

one of them sponsored by the Kuomintang.<br />

(Liberty Times/page A4, Jan. 1, 2008) Lien is the spiritual<br />

leader of the Kuomintang. His appeal was heeded.<br />

b. High threshold<br />

Kuomintang supporters knew the best way to reject<br />

the referendums is to refuse to vote so that the turnout<br />

would be lower than a simple majority. So they<br />

stayed away. Supporters of the Democratic Progressive<br />

Party also knew it full well. As a consequence, many of<br />

them did not show up to vote on the referendums, convinced<br />

that their attendance made little difference.<br />

c. Unattractive agenda<br />

Voters fully realized that, even if the referendums<br />

were adopted, none of them would be put into effect.<br />

They knew it did not matter whether they voted or did<br />

not vote.<br />

d. Marginal utility<br />

Voters understood their marginal utility was diminishing.<br />

III. Linkage of Referendums and Elections<br />

in 2008<br />

Referendums are held alongside major elections in<br />

many countries. For example, 153 referendums were<br />

held in 36 states in the United States when the presidential<br />

election was held in 2008.<br />

It is stipulated in Article 24 of the Referendum<br />

Law that the Central Election Commission shall hold a<br />

referendum within one to six months after its proposal<br />

is approved and made public. The referendum may be<br />

held alongside a national election.<br />

However, President Chen Shui-bian called the two<br />

“defensive” referendums in accordance with Article 17<br />

of the Referendum Law alongside the presidential election<br />

of 2004. He won, because of the large turnout following<br />

the shooting incident on the eve of the election.<br />

The Kuomintang was convinced that the election<br />

cum referendums, along with the shooting incident, was<br />

the cause of the loss of its presidential candidate Lien<br />

Chan. John C. Kuan, the then vice chairman of the<br />

Kuomintang, concluded after comparing the vote tabulations:<br />

“The two defensive referendums were the key to<br />

the presidential election (of 2004). In all counties and<br />

cities, our party had lower voter support when more<br />

voters voted on the referendums. For example, more<br />

than 50 percent of voters – higher than the national average<br />

of 45 percent – voted on the referendums in Yilan

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