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152 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009 after a peace treaty is signed with Japan, or until the United Nations reaches a decision on the subject.” End quote. While the US once thought about defining Taiwan’s status as “undecided” until the signing of a peace treaty with Japan to save Taiwan from the grip of Communist China, it made its stance clear following its exchange of notes with the Republic of China government in February 1951, which led to the creation of the Joint Defense and Mutual Assistance Agreement. Meanwhile, the US steadfastly refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China regime. In 1951, the Allies of World War II, including the US and the UK, began to discuss the signing of a peace treaty with Japan. Those countries that had recognized the PRC, including the UK, the Soviet Union, and India, argued that the PRC, not the ROC, should be invited to the peace conference as the representative of China. Alas! If that had happened, Taiwan would have long been part of the PRC. But it did not happen that way. That’s why I am here. What happened was that the US finally decided not to invite any representative of China to the conference, which meant neither the PRC, nor the ROC would be invited. The US postulated that Japan should be allowed to sign a separate peace treaty with either the ROC or the PRC government after restoring its sovereignty following the signing of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. Japan, at the urging of the US, chose the ROC. The Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan was signed on April 28, 1952 in Taipei, putting an end to all the uncertainties regarding the so-called undecided status of Taiwan. Furthermore, the signing of the ROC-US Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954 greatly improved Taipei’s international status. It signified the fact that the Republic of China’s sovereignty over Taiwan and Pescadores had been confirmed by international treaties. The reason is very simple. If one follows the argument that Taiwan’s status had remained undecided even after a separate peace treaty had been signed between the ROC and Japan, how would it have been possible for the United States to sign a treaty of mutual defense with the Republic of China for the specific purpose of protecting Taiwan and Pescadores? It takes only elementary knowledge in international law to see through the fallacy of its logic. I have dwelt at some length on the historical background and legal status of Taiwan for no other purpose except to show Taiwan belongs to the Republic of China. The fact that both Japan and the United States later switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing is irrelevant to the status of Taiwan, as other countries, however small the number may be, continue to recognize the Republic of China to this day. The Constitution of the Republic of China Having established that Taiwan is a province of the Republic of China, I would like to describe to you the Constitution under which it is governed. The ROC Constitution was written in 1946 by a Constituent National Assembly in Nanjing, including delegates from the Province of Taiwan. After the ROC government relocated to Taipei, the Republic of China government has effectively controlled only Taiwan and the outlying islands. The Constitution underwent several revisions since 1949; however, the Republic of China has never abandoned its sovereignty over the mainland. For this purpose, the Constitution divides the whole country into two areas, the free area (Taiwan) and the mainland area. The official map of the country says the same thing. The mainland is not a foreign state, and Taiwan is a not separate state either. The division of China is, of course, the result of a civil war; it is different from that in Germany, in which the division was imposed upon by the Allied Powers. The hot war did not end in 1949, but continued into the 1950s, highlighted by the celebrated Artillery Duel of Kinmen (Quemoy) in 1958. The hot war was followed by a cold war for three decades, characterized by three
The Foreign and Cross-Strait Policies of the New AdministrationIn the Republic of China 153 no’s: no contact, no negotiations, and no compromise, until President Chiang Ching-kuo decided in September 1987 to allow veterans to visit the mainland for family reunions. Prior to this, world politics had already changed; on December 15, 1978, the US abruptly declared that it would switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing on January 1, 1979. Taipei had to bite the bullet. The Changing Relationship across the Taiwan Strait Chiang Ching-kuo’s decision to allow army veterans to visit the mainland was far-reaching in its impact. Other citizens followed the veterans to the mainland for trade, investment, and tourism, with the government looking the other way. The exchanges increased so rapidly that in l992 both sides of the Strait sensed the need to hold talks for resolving emerging issues. As governments on both sides did not, as they still do not, recognize each other, proxy organizations had to be set up to conduct the talks. In the government structure, a separate cabinet-level agency handling mainland affairs, called the Mainland Affairs Council, was established. Under this agency, a proxy organization, the Straits Exchange Foundation, a non-profit corporation, was set up. Its counterpart, ARATS, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, was also set up. The Legislative Yuan enacted a law titled “Statute Governing Relations of People across the Taiwan Strait.” We do not stamp visas on PRC passports, but issue a separate booklet titled “Permit for Mainland Compatriots to Visit Taiwan. Likewise, the PRC does not stamp visas on ROC passports and also issue similar booklets. For the purpose of a preliminary meeting, the two proxy organizations sent delegations to Hong Kong for a first-ever meeting in October 1992. They immediately hit snags over the definition of “One China.” For us, it is the Republic of China, and both Taiwan and the mainland constitute China. For them, it is the People’s Republic of China, and Taiwan is part of China. Finally, both sides agreed that, having respectively stated their interpretations, they should shelve the issue and proceed to the formal business talks in the future. That in essence was the “Consensus of 1992.” Indeed, the principals of the two organizations, C. F. Koo and Wang Taohan, were able to meet for talks in April 1993 in Singapore. Four minor agreements were signed. Parity and dignity for both sides were meticulously observed at the meeting. A second meeting for Koo and Wang was scheduled for late 1995 in Taipei, but plans miscarried because of President Lee Teng-hui’s trip to the United States to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, was considered provocative by the PRC. The year 1996 witnessed an unfortunate missile crisis across the Strait. After the ROC government assured the world that cross-Strait relations had not changed, Koo was finally able to visit Wang in Shanghai in 1998, but not for talks. Further exchanges were aborted following Lee Teng-hui’s “special state-to-state relationship” statement of July 1999 and his successor Chen Shui-bian’s pro-independence utterances and moves. Tensions mounted to such a point that the PRC enacted a law, titled “Anti-Secession Act” in March 2005. To reduce tension, Lien Chan, then chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) Party, went to Beijing in April/May on a Journey of Peace at the invitation of Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The KMT was in opposition then, so the two leaders issued only a joint vision statement on April 29, 2005, which could be summarized as follows: (1) Resumption of talks on the basis of parity and the 1992 consensus; (2) Reaching a peace agreement, including the establishment of a confidence-building mechanism; (3) Promoting full-scale economic cooperation across the Strait, leading eventually to a cross-Strait common market;
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CONTENTS Preface Overview ix xi Foc
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Agriculture and Fisheries Impact of
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CHUANG, Yih-chyi( 莊奕琦 ) Pro
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TAN, Ching-yu( 譚瑾瑜 ) Associ
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enth effort on the part of the Foun
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ills pertinent to parliamentary ref
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