PDF(2.7mb) - 國家政策研究基金會

PLAN Looks beyond Taiwan 173
Introduction
China has increased defense spending by 10 percent
each year on the average to modernize the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) over the past two decades.
The modernization has changed the PLA thoroughly, its
navy and air force in particular. The PLA Navy (PLAN)
and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) are thoroughly modernized
fighting forces.
The PLA’s fighting capability started surpassing
that of the defense force of the Republic of China in
2006. The PLA is now capable of defeating Taiwan.
But China’s military buildup has not slowed down.
That makes Western defense strategists believe
China is looking beyond Taiwan in strategic planning.
Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon U.S.N.(Ret.) expressed
his concern over this PLAN strategic thinking in his
“China’s Maturing Navy,” 1 The U.S. Department of
Defense has also included this issue in a report to the
Congress in 2008 2 .
The truth is that the Western concerns are not justified.
The PLAN’s main interest is defense. It is true
the PLAN launched amphibious vessels and is planning
to acquire an aircraft carrier combat group but its primary
purposes are to deepen its perimeter of naval defense
to ensure the security of China’s southeastern
coast. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the
PLAN intends projection of power beyond Taiwan into
the Pacific. It is very difficult for Taiwan to establish an
asymmetric capability to cope with the PLAN thrust.
This paper aims to assess the new naval buildup in
China.
PLAN’s Strategic Thinking
China’s naval force was charged with coastal defense
when the People’s Republic was proclaimed in
1 Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Future Nuclear Submarine
Force” 2007 USNI press, page 22
2 “ Military Power of PRC 2008,” DoD
1949. 3 In fact, the navy was a branch of the People’s
Liberation Army.
In August 1979, Deng Xiaoping ordered the PLA
to build up a “navy with a formidable and modern
fighting capability” that could engage in offshore operations.
This is a turning point for the PLAN’s strategic
transformation from “coastal defense” to “offshore
defense.” 4
In 1982 Admiral Lieu Huaqing, the then PLAN
commander, ordered the Naval Research College to
develop a strategy of offshore defense. He had the
PLAN’s long-term offshore defense development plan
prepared in 1988. Under that plan, the PLAN will acquire
a blue-water presence along the first island chain
in the South China Sea by 2010. 5 By 2025 the presence
will be extended to the second island chain. 6 The third
island chain will be covered by 2050.
The term “offshore” must mean “within 200-600
3 Mao Zedong said in 1949: “We must strive to form an
air force which can defend our coasts together with
our ‘river navy.’”
4 See China’s Defense White Paper, issued in December
2006. The PLAN carries on offshore defense
missions. According to a 1997 version of "Military
Terminology," the term “offshore” designates all the
“sea area close to land.” China’s offshore defense
covers the Bohai, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South
China Sea and sea areas east of Taiwan.
5 The first island chain includes the Kurile Islands and
the Ryukyu Islands of Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines,
and Borneo. The area includes the Yellow sea, East
China Sea, and South China Sea.
6 The second island chain includes all islands along the
north-south line from the Kuriles through Japan to
the Ryukyus and the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines,
and Indonesia.