PDF(2.7mb) - 國家政策研究基金會
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14 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009<br />
Eligible voters went to the polls to elect a new<br />
Legislative Yuan and their president and vice president<br />
in early 2008. Taiwan’s two major parties began their<br />
campaigns of 2008 much earlier than were due. One<br />
reason was that President Chen Shui-bian had to win<br />
the two pivotal elections in a row in order to keep his<br />
Democratic Progressive Party in power for his political<br />
survival after his retirement. The legislative elections<br />
took place first. In the past, parliamentary elections<br />
were held in early December, at least three months before<br />
the Legislative Yuan met for its opening session in<br />
February in accordance with the Constitution. Chen<br />
wanted the new Legislative Yuan to be elected not too<br />
long before the presidential election. As a result, Chen<br />
had the legislative elections moved back to January 12,<br />
2008 from the originally scheduled first week of December<br />
2007. In his capacity as chairman of the ruling<br />
party, Chen kicked off the parliamentary campaign,<br />
which would be a warm-up for the presidential election<br />
of March 22, earlier than was necessary in an attempt to<br />
crush the precarious majority of the opposition bloc in<br />
the Legislative Yuan. He thought the ruling party had an<br />
even chance to win both legislative and presidential<br />
elections.<br />
Chen resorted to his wonted China-baiting tactic,<br />
wishing if provoked enough, Beijing would threaten to<br />
invade Taiwan, thereby so hardening the anti-Chinese<br />
feelings in Taiwan as to get all swing voters to vote for<br />
the Democratic Progressive Party. He first tried to abolish<br />
the National Unification Council and the Guidelines<br />
for National Unification. The council, created by<br />
President Lee Teng-hui in 1990, adopted the guidelines<br />
on August 1, 1992. The guidelines define “one China”<br />
with a different interpretation. To Beijing, that one<br />
China may be the People’s Republic of China with<br />
Taiwan as a “special administrative region” after reunification.<br />
Taipei, on the other hand, considers “one China”<br />
to mean the Republic of China, founded in 1912<br />
and with de jure sovereignty over all of China. The<br />
guidelines prescribe a three-step process for Chinese<br />
reunification. Taiwan, according to this process, is now<br />
in the medium-term phase – a phase of mutual trust and<br />
cooperation – which features the establishment of<br />
channels of communication to usher in direct postal,<br />
transport and commercial links and an exchange of visits<br />
by government leaders between the two sides of the<br />
Strait. In the final phase, the two sides would establish<br />
a consultative organization for unification through<br />
which they will jointly discuss their task, while adhering<br />
to the goals of democracy, economic freedom, social<br />
justice and nationalization of the armed forces, and<br />
finally map out a constitutional system to establish a<br />
democratic, free and equitably prospering China. The<br />
guidelines provide the legal basis for the consensus of<br />
1992, which is an agreement on “one China with a different<br />
interpretation.” And that is why President Chen<br />
was compelled to commit himself in two inaugural addresses<br />
not to abolish the council as well as the guidelines<br />
as part of his pledge not to change the status quo<br />
across the Taiwan Strait.<br />
When President Chen made known his decision to<br />
terminate the council as well as the guidelines in 2006,<br />
the United States was greatly alarmed. Washington<br />
considered it a move to unilaterally change the status<br />
quo as it defines. The Department of State issued<br />
warning after grim warning, though China kept mum,<br />
preferring to watch the Americans trying rein in President<br />
Chen. The Chinese learned a lesson in 1996.<br />
Jiang Zeming threatened to war on Taiwan to intimidate<br />
the electorate ready to vote for President Lee Teng-hui.<br />
China did not like Lee to be reelected, but the threat<br />
backfired. Lee won a decisive victory. After months of<br />
frenetic consultations with Washington, Chen was finally<br />
able to have the council “cease to function” and<br />
the guidelines “cease to apply.” He claimed victory in<br />
effectively “terminating” both.<br />
De-Sinicization<br />
The next step President Chen took was an all-out<br />
drive to de-Sinicize Taiwan, of which a posthumous<br />
dethroning of President Chiang Kai-shek was a main<br />
feature. The time was right. He wanted to remind the<br />
people of how Chiang was involved in the February 28<br />
Incident of 1947 on its sixtieth anniversary. As a starter,