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PDF(2.7mb) - 國家政策研究基金會

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14 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009<br />

Eligible voters went to the polls to elect a new<br />

Legislative Yuan and their president and vice president<br />

in early 2008. Taiwan’s two major parties began their<br />

campaigns of 2008 much earlier than were due. One<br />

reason was that President Chen Shui-bian had to win<br />

the two pivotal elections in a row in order to keep his<br />

Democratic Progressive Party in power for his political<br />

survival after his retirement. The legislative elections<br />

took place first. In the past, parliamentary elections<br />

were held in early December, at least three months before<br />

the Legislative Yuan met for its opening session in<br />

February in accordance with the Constitution. Chen<br />

wanted the new Legislative Yuan to be elected not too<br />

long before the presidential election. As a result, Chen<br />

had the legislative elections moved back to January 12,<br />

2008 from the originally scheduled first week of December<br />

2007. In his capacity as chairman of the ruling<br />

party, Chen kicked off the parliamentary campaign,<br />

which would be a warm-up for the presidential election<br />

of March 22, earlier than was necessary in an attempt to<br />

crush the precarious majority of the opposition bloc in<br />

the Legislative Yuan. He thought the ruling party had an<br />

even chance to win both legislative and presidential<br />

elections.<br />

Chen resorted to his wonted China-baiting tactic,<br />

wishing if provoked enough, Beijing would threaten to<br />

invade Taiwan, thereby so hardening the anti-Chinese<br />

feelings in Taiwan as to get all swing voters to vote for<br />

the Democratic Progressive Party. He first tried to abolish<br />

the National Unification Council and the Guidelines<br />

for National Unification. The council, created by<br />

President Lee Teng-hui in 1990, adopted the guidelines<br />

on August 1, 1992. The guidelines define “one China”<br />

with a different interpretation. To Beijing, that one<br />

China may be the People’s Republic of China with<br />

Taiwan as a “special administrative region” after reunification.<br />

Taipei, on the other hand, considers “one China”<br />

to mean the Republic of China, founded in 1912<br />

and with de jure sovereignty over all of China. The<br />

guidelines prescribe a three-step process for Chinese<br />

reunification. Taiwan, according to this process, is now<br />

in the medium-term phase – a phase of mutual trust and<br />

cooperation – which features the establishment of<br />

channels of communication to usher in direct postal,<br />

transport and commercial links and an exchange of visits<br />

by government leaders between the two sides of the<br />

Strait. In the final phase, the two sides would establish<br />

a consultative organization for unification through<br />

which they will jointly discuss their task, while adhering<br />

to the goals of democracy, economic freedom, social<br />

justice and nationalization of the armed forces, and<br />

finally map out a constitutional system to establish a<br />

democratic, free and equitably prospering China. The<br />

guidelines provide the legal basis for the consensus of<br />

1992, which is an agreement on “one China with a different<br />

interpretation.” And that is why President Chen<br />

was compelled to commit himself in two inaugural addresses<br />

not to abolish the council as well as the guidelines<br />

as part of his pledge not to change the status quo<br />

across the Taiwan Strait.<br />

When President Chen made known his decision to<br />

terminate the council as well as the guidelines in 2006,<br />

the United States was greatly alarmed. Washington<br />

considered it a move to unilaterally change the status<br />

quo as it defines. The Department of State issued<br />

warning after grim warning, though China kept mum,<br />

preferring to watch the Americans trying rein in President<br />

Chen. The Chinese learned a lesson in 1996.<br />

Jiang Zeming threatened to war on Taiwan to intimidate<br />

the electorate ready to vote for President Lee Teng-hui.<br />

China did not like Lee to be reelected, but the threat<br />

backfired. Lee won a decisive victory. After months of<br />

frenetic consultations with Washington, Chen was finally<br />

able to have the council “cease to function” and<br />

the guidelines “cease to apply.” He claimed victory in<br />

effectively “terminating” both.<br />

De-Sinicization<br />

The next step President Chen took was an all-out<br />

drive to de-Sinicize Taiwan, of which a posthumous<br />

dethroning of President Chiang Kai-shek was a main<br />

feature. The time was right. He wanted to remind the<br />

people of how Chiang was involved in the February 28<br />

Incident of 1947 on its sixtieth anniversary. As a starter,

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