PDF(2.7mb) - 國家政策研究基金會
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178 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009<br />
enormous budget fund to build such a fleet and acquires<br />
overseas bases to support its operation. One option is<br />
open to China. The PLAN may build a superior asymmetrical<br />
force, such as a nuclear attack submarine fleet,<br />
to do part of the job so as to protect China’s greatest<br />
national interests with the help of other sea powers who<br />
wish to uphold the freedom of navigation principle of<br />
the United Nations.<br />
But the question remains: What if the intent is<br />
not purely to defend the sea lanes? 24<br />
Aircraft Carriers and Blue-Water Navy<br />
1. Extension of Force to the Second Island<br />
Chain<br />
In November 2008, a surface action group of the<br />
North Sea Fleet of the PLAN entered the Sea of Japan,<br />
crossed the Tsugaru Strait, and sailed into the North<br />
Pacific Ocean to conduct an anti-submarine and surface<br />
interception exercise. The group consisted of four ships,<br />
including a 051C class missile destroyer. Soon after the<br />
exercise, another task group from the East Sea Fleet led<br />
by a Soveremnny class missile destroyer followed the<br />
same route to hold a fleet exercise in the North Pacific.<br />
The exercises marked the second and the third times<br />
the PLAN warships passed through the Tsugaru Strait.<br />
The first passage took place when a survey ship crossed<br />
the strait for data collection. The passages of the warships<br />
aroused the concern of Japan and the United<br />
States.<br />
They are concerned that the exercises took place<br />
beyond China’s first island chain and the PLAN is<br />
reaching out to the second island chain. If so, China<br />
may be planning to develop a blue-water navy.<br />
2. Evolution of the PLAN into a Blue-Water<br />
Navy<br />
China’s most critical geopolitical weakness lies in<br />
its lack of enough sea power to protect the sea lanes for<br />
its crude oil supply and foreign trade. 25 It needs a navy<br />
to safeguard the sea lanes as the economic globalization<br />
continues.<br />
The PLAN cannot cope with the navies of the<br />
United States, Japan and India that may choke China’s<br />
vital sea lanes from the East China Sea to the Middle<br />
East through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean,<br />
if they so choose. The PLAN needs long-range operation<br />
capabilities.<br />
In fact, Admirals Xiao Jinguang and Liu<br />
Huaqing have long complained: “We can do nothing, if<br />
we have only small and medium-sized short-range<br />
ships and share-based air force in the face of an enemy<br />
who has long-range combat capabilities and can deploy<br />
ballistic missile submarines and a carrier-based air<br />
force.” 26<br />
But China has continued to adhere to the policy of<br />
not acquiring a blue-water navy, which can operate in<br />
any ocean of the world. 27<br />
3. Construction of Aircraft Carriers<br />
25 The US intelligence agency related activity analyzes<br />
China to make the aircraft carrier motive peripheral<br />
situation to compel, http://www.chinareviewnews.<br />
com , Dec. 28, 2007<br />
26 The concept of Chinese aircraft carrier of two generation<br />
Command in Chief of PLAN ADM. Xiao<br />
Jin-guang and ADM. Liu Huaqing in. WorldForum.com<br />
Nov.19, 2008<br />
27 Chinese Maritime Strategy, Chapter 7, The PLA<br />
24 Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Adm. Gary<br />
Roughhead: Why Does China Need That Navy? By<br />
Richard Halloran, THE WASHINGTON TIMES,<br />
August 26, 2005<br />
Navy and “Active Defense” Bernard D. Cole, The<br />
PLA and China in transition, Stephen J. Flanagan and<br />
Michael E. Marti. National Security Studies, NDU,<br />
2003