PDF(2.7mb) - 國家政策研究基金會

208 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009
with the original Hoover Commission work, NPR’s
goal was to enhance performance accountability by
eliminating wasteful spending and achieving better
program results through an extensive review of performance.
Executive leadership support plays an important
role in the U.S. case of PBB implementation. Both the
Clinton administration and Congress demonstrated
strong willingness and supports for the implementation
of GPRA and PBB. The central role of OMB in the
implementation was ensured in the content of GPRA.
The Bush administration continued the effort of PBB
with the implementation of the Program Assessment
Rating Tool (PART) to assess program purposes, strategic
planning, program management, and results of federal
programs (U.S. OMB 2004). PART was believed to
have limited but steady impact on the managerial
communication and decision-making of managers
(Newcomer 2007). Moreover, the message to improve
government performance and accountability through
PBB is resonated at various levels of governments in
the United States (Broom and McGuire 1995; Melkers
and Willoughby 1998; Wang 2000).
Taiwan
The Executive Yuan or Cabinet called a national
conference on administrative reforms in 2001, launching
a series of budgetary reforms intended to transform
the executive agencies into result-oriented performers.
In the same year, the government issued the Administrative
Regulations of Performance Assessment for
Agencies (ARPAA) under the Executive Yuan, outlining
a performance-based budgeting framework for the
public sector in Taiwan.
The ARPAA required each agency to submit strategic
performance objectives, performance indicators,
and performance targets in three key performance dimensions
of services, manpower, and funding. Each
agency was also required to develop five to ten strategic
performance objectives, as well as performance indicators
for each objective that reflect its specific functions
and activities.
All agencies subordinate to the Executive Yuan as
well as local governments were required to implement
PBB. At the end of each fiscal year, the performance of
each was checked against the performance objective.
PBB-related training courses have been offered at various
levels of governments, including city and county
governments, to improve the capability of implementation.
Compared with some other PBB systems in the
world, the reform in Taiwan has a distinctive emphasis
on two aspects of the PBB practice. One is the presence
of a strong executive leadership to implement and constantly
evaluate the practices of the reform. Hundreds
of major projects in the PBB reform are under control
of the Executive Yuan. The annual performance evaluation
of these projects is submitted to the Research, Development,
and Evaluation Commission (RDEC) of the
Executive Yuan. The RDEC assembles committees
consisting of members from Council for Economic
Planning and Development (CEPD), National Science
Council (NSC), Directorate General of Budget Accounting
and Statistics (DGBAS), and Central Personnel
Administration (CPA), as well as experts outside the
government to review and evaluate the performance of
these projects and their affiliated agencies. The final
evaluation results are published on RDEC website for
public review and are used in making funding decisions.
The RDEC also monitors the progress of each program
and verifies such progress with on-site inspections. A
monitoring report is published regularly.
The second distinctive feature of the Taiwan reform
is a carefully designed process of project management
in which each project in the PBB is subject to
intensified administrative scrutiny in planning, implementation,
and evaluation (Sung, 2008). Figure 1 illustrates
this process of preliminary self-evaluation, classification
and control, supervision, and performance
assessment. Included first in a medium-term (four-year)
plan, various governmental projects are incorporated in
an annual plan after a preliminary self-evaluation by