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164 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009 Thirty Years of TRA The coming April will mark the 30 th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), a U.S. Congressional ingenuity in governing the conduct of a particular U. S. foreign policy in the wake of Carter Administration’s de-recognition of the Republic of China (R.O.C) while establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Through all seven U.S. Administrations, Democratic and Republican, the TRA has been upheld and abided by, and often times, termed as a “success”. The R.O.C. only hopes that this “law of the land” is fully and faithfully implemented while weathering the diplomatic storm and trying her utmost to maintain her critically important relations with the U.S. The R.O.C. did well. Self-reliance has been her key to R.O.C.’s progress and prosperity in the last thirty years. Nevertheless, like the R.O.C.--U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, which provided Taiwan a formidable protective shield against any external threats for 25 years, the TRA has been working in a similar manner in providing a useful shelter, in political, security, and other areas for the “people on Taiwan”. Certainly, there have been ups and downs, given the changes taking place within, between and among Taipei, Beijing and Washington as well as in the international arena. The Changing Times No one would have foreseen merely a decade after the enactment of TRA that the world had gone through dramatic changes such as the collapse of communism, globalization which contributed greatly to the rise of the People’s Republic of China, rampaging terrorism, climate change, the current financial tsunami, etc. Meanwhile, within all three parties in the triangular relationships, changes in political, economic, social and other areas have taken place at an unprecedented pace and extent. No one could have imagined that Dr. Martin Luther King’s dream of the 60’s would come true in less than half a century. It was beyond belief that after some two decades of upheavals of heated politics and social polarization created by a few groups of special interests in Taiwan, the voters elected a “mainlander” president by a landslide. Across the Taiwan Strait, a sea change has been taking place by transforming the huge communist country into a massive capitalist factory for the entire world, elevating the PRC to a new and proud status as a major power. Against this tremendous backdrop, a review of the TRA as well as the status of triangular relationships ought to be conducted in the right context. TRA at Twenty When one looks back to the testimony of a responsible official before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, entitled “Twenty Years of the Taiwan Relations Act”, on March 25, 1999, it would be interesting to notice that the some of his comments would still be appropriate today. Stanley Roth, the then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, declared the TRA “a resounding success.” Mr. Roth pointed out that while the gains in the U.S.-PRC and the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship have been formidable, the Beijing-Taipei relationship has actually experienced the most dramatic improvements. Taiwan’s security over the long term depends more on the two sides coming to terms with each other than on the military balance. However, he also emphasized that despite modest qualitative improvements in the military forces of both China and Taiwan, the dynamic equilibrium of these forces in the Taiwan Strait has not changed dramatically over the last two decades. This means that for twenty years the TRA had been effective. Mr. Roth said in the same testimony that the Clinton Administration carried out a lengthy interagency review of U.S.-Taiwan policy. Based on the review, the Administration took a number of specific steps:
Stabilizing the Triangle: A Personal View from Taipei 165 First, cabinet-level U.S. officials from economic and technical agencies were authorized to travel to Taiwan when appropriate. Second, the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement-TIFA-talks and the Sub-cabinet Level Economic Dialogue-SLED-were set up to promote bilateral economic relations. Third, the U.S. would support Taiwan’s participation in international organizations that do not require statehood for membership. In conclusion, Mr. Roth stressed that the U.S. firmly believes that the future of cross-Strait relations is a matter for Beijing and Taipei to resolve and the U.S. has an abiding interest that any resolution be peaceful. In view of Mr. Roth’s testimony on TRA then, we may find that the law and its effectiveness remain unchanged today. When the law and the pertinent policies of the three sides are put into the context, we will find the clues and nuances the evolution of the changing times may have brought about. The Eight-Year Turmoil After eight years of the roller-coasting of the cross-strait relations, especially the later half of it, Chen Shui-bian’s brinkmanship of a “non-policy” conduct of erratic international and domestic behavior brought the triangular relationships to a new low and even to a possible catastrophe on a motive yet to be uncovered . Thanks to the wisdom of the people on Taiwan, Mr. Chen Shui-bian’s initiatives on two unthinkable referenda tied to two presidential elections on the totally irrelevant and risky subjects within a span of four years were soundly rejected by the majority of the voters. His long-awaited departure from the office eventually offered an opportunity for a sigh of relief to all those concerned about the peace and security in the Taiwan Strait and the future of the triangular relationships. Across the Taiwan Strait, perhaps puzzled by Chen’s incomprehensible behavior, the Beijing leadership was sitting tight and in a far more skillful and sophisticated fashion playing the chess game via Washington than what their predecessors did during the past politically sensitive times. Beijing’s adoption of the Anti-secession Law, though unnecessary in Taiwan’s view, seemed to have served their purpose at the time to keep Chen Shui-bian at bay and sent a clear signal to the U.S. that the bottom-line is not to be ignored. President George W. Bush apparently was annoyed by Chen’s persistent provocative behavior which served no one’s interest and was harmful to all, sternly warned Mr. Chen once even through TV program with Premier Wen Jiabao on his side. During Chen’s second term, his Administration played a meaningless role of a trouble-maker in the triangular relations and a laughing stock internationally. The Dawn of Peace In the spring of 2005, Dr. Lien Chan, the former vice president and chairman of the Kuomintang, made a historic visit to Beijing . His Journey of peace, which was viewed as highly successful and “ice-melting”, made a significant first step for confidence-building between the two parties, thus cancelling considerably the destabilizing effect Chen Shui-bian’s words and deeds had produced and reduced greatly the possibilities of armed conflicts in the Strait due to miscalculation. When Mr. Ma Ying-jeou became the presidential candidate of the Kuomintang in 2007, his campaign platform to pursue a policy of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” in order to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait was not only a right answer to the wishes of the majority of voters on the island, but in the common interest of all parties in the triangular relationships. Mr. Ma won the election by a historic landslide with more than 58 per cent of the votes. When he took office in May 2008, his inaugural speech again reaffirmed his policy toward the mainland.
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CONTENTS Preface Overview ix xi Foc
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Agriculture and Fisheries Impact of
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CHUANG, Yih-chyi( 莊奕琦 ) Pro
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TAN, Ching-yu( 譚瑾瑜 ) Associ
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enth effort on the part of the Foun
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ills pertinent to parliamentary ref
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