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180 Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009 The PLAN has taken delivery of Hospital Ship 866. 34 The two amphibious assault vessels, together with the hospital ship, contribute to the PLAN capability of action in the South China Sea, according to John Pike at Globalsecurity.Org, a think-tank at Alexandria, Virginia. He says Hospital Ship 866 and the amphibious assault vessels were designed to give China military options for claiming disputed natural gas and oil reserves in the South China Sea. He adds: "One would enforce a claim to the South China Sea by possessing islands. How does one possess island? By amphibious assault." 35 The trio may carry out "military operations other than war(MOOTW)." This is a new mission to offer humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Bob Work, a naval analyst at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, says Hospital Ship 866 may be engaged in MOOTW. "The tsunami embarrassed them (the Chinese)," he says, adding: "The Chinese respond to embarrassments in very focused ways. In this case by rushing new ships into production.” 36 World Politics Review reported: “Although the vessels are intended for more conventional military tasks, they could find themselves pressed into humanitarian missions during major disasters. Either way, Ship 866 and the Type 071s are windows into an evolving military strategy for an emerging world power.” Construction of these ships will be beneficial to the PLAN in the overseas military operations other than 34 Defense News reported: “The 866’s aft deck has a helipad. It is deployed for the convenience of the Chinese navy to conduct operations in the South China Sea.” 35 David Axe “War is Boring: New Chinese Naval Ships a Window into Evolving Strategy.” World Politics Review, Nov. 12, 2008 36 Ibid. war in a contest with the United States for projection of "soft power." The commission of the hospital ship will be more convenient to the PLAN expanding China’s external influence in the future. 37 Conclusion If China doesn’t have expansionist ambitions that the Soviet Union in cold war did, 38 the statement that China is in the process of transforming itself from a strong land power to a powerful maritime country is untenable. Equally untenable is the statement that the future development may close this gap by extending the range of power projection. In fact China's ideological and theoretical concept for development of its navy is different from what has motivated the Western big powers. China has selectively adopted Mahan’s concept. 39 China emphasizes equality in rights and benefits. Its sea power is designed to protect its sea rights. Its approach is peaceful: sea power is needed for self-defense. “China hopes to create a buffer around its continental and maritime periphery that will increase the cost for other states to conduct military operations against targets on the mainland.” 40 37 ”Foreign media say the People's Liberation Army hospital ship fitted out amphibious assault ship preparing to attack the island.” ChinaReviewNews.com, Nov. 18, 2008 38 U.S. Intelligence Analysis: “Tthe building aircraft carriers of China is forced by the situation surrounding.” chinareviewnews.com, Dec. 28, 2007 39 Toshi Yoshihara ”China’s Turn to Mahan: Implication for Taiwan’s Security” U.S. Naval War College, Nov. 2008 40 M. Taylor Fravel, “Chinas Search for Military Power” 2008 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Washington Quarterly, 31:3 pp.
PLAN Looks beyond Taiwan 181 China follows Zheng He much more than Mahan. China's naval strategy has been considered similar to those of big powers for a long time. The PLAN’s strength and development were over-exaggerated. Actually the PLAN’s ability to project and sustain power far overseas remains limited. Currently, the PLAN is unable to resort to force to make China’s foreign energy investments secure or to effectively defend the vital sea lanes against disruption. The PLAN is facing an ambition-capability gap, while it only has local sea denial capabilities: mines, submarines, maritime strike aircraft, and modern surface combatants equipped with advanced ASCMs provide a supporting layer of defense for its long-range anti-access systems. Cortez A. Cooper III sums up the PLAN sea denial capabilities well: By 2008, China is capable of short-term sea denial operations up 400 nautical miles from coast; by 2010, it may be able to sustain such operations for a few weeks; and after 2015, the PLAN can show the flag in the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. 41 The PLAN will try to develop conservatively thereafter. It will not seek hegemony over the oceans. It will plan its own development carefully. 125–141. 41 Statement of Cortez A. Cooper III for a March 16, 2006, hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
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CONTENTS Preface Overview ix xi Foc
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Agriculture and Fisheries Impact of
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CHUANG, Yih-chyi( 莊奕琦 ) Pro
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TAN, Ching-yu( 譚瑾瑜 ) Associ
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enth effort on the part of the Foun
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ills pertinent to parliamentary ref
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