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Architecture and management of a geological repository - Andra

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11 – Operational SafetyThe internal exposure associated with the radioactive gases emitted by some B waste packages <strong>and</strong>released into the environment has been estimated on the basis <strong>of</strong> the assumption that the <strong>repository</strong> hascompleted operations, that is to say, with the entire inventory <strong>of</strong> B waste taken into account (cf.Chapter 3). This preliminary estimate was made at the periphery <strong>of</strong> the <strong>repository</strong> site, taken as 500 mfrom the exhaust air chimney. The calculation, which takes into account the radiological activityreleased by the waste packages <strong>and</strong> a transfer factor in man that combines all three means <strong>of</strong> exposureshows that the annual dose for a member <strong>of</strong> the public <strong>of</strong> the order <strong>of</strong> 1μSv, would be negligible.Internal exposure associated with radon gas diffused by broken rock stored above ground or related toemissions from the underground installation ventilation system will depend on a number <strong>of</strong> factors: theradon exhalation rate from the argillites, ventilation flow in the underground installations <strong>and</strong> theheight <strong>of</strong> the exhaust air chimney, length <strong>and</strong> type <strong>of</strong> open drifts (drifts under construction or inoperation) <strong>and</strong> local atmospheric conditions. As in the preceding case, it can be considered negligiblewhen the nature <strong>of</strong> the <strong>geological</strong> environment <strong>and</strong> experience in comparable facilities is taken intoaccount.Although the emission <strong>of</strong> radioactive gas from the underground installations appears to be negligible,it would, nonetheless, be monitored by measuring the radioactivity <strong>of</strong> the air as is conventionally donein the context <strong>of</strong> the operational surveillance <strong>of</strong> a nuclear facility.11.1.3 ConclusionGiven the measures employed to counter the radiological risk in the design <strong>of</strong> the installations <strong>and</strong>their mode <strong>of</strong> operation, the doses received by the personnel on site or by a member <strong>of</strong> the public atthe periphery <strong>of</strong> the site should be below the annual limits fixed by <strong>Andra</strong> for radiolologicalprotection, <strong>and</strong> well below statutory limits. It should also be remembered that these are preliminaryestimates <strong>and</strong> do not take into account any subsequent optimisation approach.11.2 Risk analysisThis section assesses the risks identified in the installations for all disposal activities (construction,operation <strong>and</strong> closure) <strong>and</strong> proposes associated reduction measures. It distinguishes between "internal"risks related to work carried out in the facilities <strong>and</strong> "external" risks, related to the environment (whichare dealt with in a more generic fashion).The risks examined in the context <strong>of</strong> the study are those that are liable to have an impact on people orthe environment. However, the operational consequences (deterioration <strong>of</strong> work tools, drop inproduction) are not dealt with at this stage.This assessment [107] can be used to highlight certain particular risks which have been the subject <strong>of</strong>additional studies (cf. Sections 11.3 to 11.8) on account <strong>of</strong> their specificity or their impact on thedesign <strong>of</strong> the <strong>repository</strong> <strong>and</strong> its equipment.11.2.1 MethodologyThe analysis begins by identifying sources <strong>of</strong> danger associated with disposal activities. It has beencarried out with the support <strong>of</strong> experts in the different technical fields concerned (nuclear installations,shaft transfert equipment, underground tunnels, etc.) that have used st<strong>and</strong>ard danger lists 153 <strong>and</strong> havebrought their experience with comparable installations to bear.This analysis, which has been structured around physical components (surface installations, accessshafts, underground installations) <strong>and</strong> activities (construction, operation, closure), systematically takesaccount <strong>of</strong> compliance with operational safety functions. It <strong>of</strong>fers the most exhaustive view possible atthis stage in the studies <strong>of</strong> the risks likely to be encountered by personnel <strong>and</strong> the environment.153 Among the st<strong>and</strong>ard danger lists, the MADS (Methodology for the Analysis <strong>of</strong> the Malfunction <strong>of</strong> Systems) <strong>and</strong> the MOSAR (MethodOrganised for a Systematic Analysis <strong>of</strong> Risks) approaches are the most frequently used in the risk analysis <strong>of</strong> an industrial installation.DOSSIER 2005 ARGILE -ARCHITECTURE AND MANAGEMENT OF A GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL SYSTEM442/495

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