Governing the City State - Chief Minister and Treasury Directorate ...

clear examples of offices which must exist because their roles at arm’s length from thegovernment are part of the foundation of the ACT’s system of government and accountabilityframeworks. Offices in this grouping would include the Auditor-General, the Director ofPublic Prosecutions, the Human Rights Commission, and the Electoral Commissioner.In keeping with their independence, these offices should receive appropriation funding intheir own right. While the level of resourcing for those officers is properly a matter for theGovernment to determine in setting the Budget, it is appropriate that funding for independentoffice holders be appropriated directly to their offices.A continuum of degrees of autonomy is evident in the responsibilities of statutory officeholders in the ACT ranging from the Auditor-General (at the end characterised by the mostindependence) through various permutations to positions like the Commissioner for Housingwhich are held by senior officials who also discharge senior leadership roles within adepartmental structure. Indeed, even within some offices, there is a continuum ofindependence in that in certain aspects of the role, officers are completely independent ofgovernment (e.g. conduct of elections), but in others are uniquely placed to offer expertpolicy advice to the Government.In a city state government, there are inevitably conflicts of interest that need to be managed,but there is no reason why this cannot be done without compromising the independence ofthose office holders. It may well be that in NSW for example, the positions equivalent tothose occupied by a single senior official who also holds statutory powers in the ACT areoccupied by two people because there is a far greater workload. In the ACT, if the workloadis not there, it is inefficient and undesirable to continue to pursue statutory independence for afull time office holder.In this context, the Review notes that in its Submission, the Community and Public SectorUnion argued for an expansion of the role of the Commissioner for Public Administration,suggesting that:a consolidated and enhanced role would significantly improve ACTPS transparency,performance and reporting. CPSU understands the office operates part time and must rely onthe capacity and resources of CMD. This arrangement demonstrates the ongoing deteriorationof ACTPS accountability and undermines the independence of the office. 173The Review does not accept the underlying assumptions contained in this suggestion: that itis the independence of the statutory office that determines the quality of what it produces.There may be issues to do with resourcing of that area of the current CMD, but that does notof itself suggest an undermining of the independence of that office, or that additionalresourcing would enhance its independence.The Review recommends the Public Interest Map applied to boards and committees abovemight be adapted to consider the need for, and role of, statutory office holders in the ACT.173 Submission No.11.Governing the City State: 103