Governing the City State - Chief Minister and Treasury Directorate ...

central direction in developing their strategic plans and the governor wished for thebudget, the statewide plan and agency plans to focus on the same set of goals. 274That is not to say performance budgeting is easy. Crucially, the simple “provision of thisinformation alone is not sufficient to improve performance: it has to be used in decisionmaking”. 275 It should not be assumed that the ACTPS has the necessary capacity orcapability to engage with performance information and use it to its greatest advantage. TheOECD cautions that member countries have experienced difficulties, especially in theirministries of finance in developing the necessary institutional capacity. It notes performanceinformation:is different from financial information. In order to make judgments and compareperformance, the [ministry of finance (MOF)] needs the relevant expertise to be ableto analyse and evaluate the information received from different spending ministries.Spending ministries … like the MOF, will need the capacity to understand and276evaluate information they receive.Performance and Accountability MechanismsAccountability of the Executive to the Legislature is fundamental to the Latimer HousePrinciples and is the cornerstone of any assessment of government performance. It is anaccepted and valued principle that permeates the governance framework in which the ACTGovernment and ACTPS operate. In a democracy, the key accountability relationships arebetween citizens and holders of public office, and between elected politicians andbureaucrats. 277Historically, Westminster bureaucracies are well suited to hierarchical lines of authority andaccountability through the “chain of ministerial responsibility, upwards through thedepartmental hierarchy to the secretary and the minister and, via the minister, to Parliamentand the public”. 278 These traditional hierarchical reporting and accountability lines are wellsuited where “it is clear what action should be taken, what the effects of that action will be, orwhere the Government prefers consistency and uniformity over innovation and creativity”. 279Traditional vertical accountability is given effect through parliamentary processes includingquestion time and committee processes which themselves are often amplified through themedia. These processes are supplemented by other mechanisms including independentinstitutions like auditors-general, ombudsmen, and the courts, as well as freedom ofinformation regimes. 280 In the ACT context, the Human Rights Commissioner should beadded to this list given the operation of the Human Rights Act 2004. 281274 Moynihan, D. & Ingraham, P. (2003) “Looking for the Silver Lining: When Performance-Based Accountability Systems Work”Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory. 13(4) pp.469-490, p.481.275 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007) p.40.276 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007) p.69.277 Mulgan, R. (2000) ‘“Accountability”: An Ever-Expanding Concept?’, Public Administration, 78(3) pp.555-573. p. 556.278 Mulgan, R. (2002) “Accountability Issues in the New Model of Governance”. Discussion Paper No 91. Australian NationalUniversity, Canberra, pp.4-5.279 Australian Public Service Commission (2009b) Delivering Performance and Accountability Canberra, pp.51280 Mulgan (2002) pp.4-5281 See http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/2004-5/default.aspStrategy, Resource Allocation and the Vacant Middle Ground: 224