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different times by different English philosophers in senses
so various, that, until our philosophical terminology has
by universal consent attained far greater precision than at
present, it must always be difficult for the writer or translator
to convey to the reader s mind precisely the same thought
that was in his own. To prevent unnecessary confusion
however, by leaving too much to chance, I will here briefly
state those terms which give most latitude for misappre
hension, explaining the sense in which I employ them and
also the special meaning attached to some of them by
Schopenhauer, who often differs in this from other writers.
are as follows.
They
(a..) Anschauung (anschauen, literally to behold ) I
have rendered differently, according to its double mean
ing in German. When used to designate the mental act by
which an object is perceived, as the cause of a sensation
received, it is rendered by perception. When used to lay
stress upon immediate, as opposed to abstract representa
tion, it is rendered by intuition.
more often in the adjective form.
This last occurs however
(b.) Vorstellung (vorstellen, literally * to place before ) I
render by representation in spite of its foreign, unwelcome
sound to the English ear, as being the term which nearest
approaches the G-erman meaning. The faculty of repre
sentation is defined by Schopenhauer himself as
"
an
exceedingly complicated physiological process in the brain
of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a
picture there."
(c.) Auffassung (auffassen, literally to catch up ) has so
in G-erman that it has to be
many shades of meaning
translated in many different ways according to the relation
in which it stands in the context. It signifies apprehension,
comprehension, perception, viewing and grasping.
(d.) Wahrnehmung (^ ^ihrnehmen, from wahr, true, and
nehmen, to take), is translated by apprehension or perception,
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