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102 THE FOTJEPOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.
among objects, and in consequence obeys the laws of the
objective, material world. For the observer, as a purely
cognising individual, any movement of his body is simply
an empirically perceived fact. It would be just as pos
sible in the second as in the first instance, to invert the
order of succession in the change, were it as easy for the
observer to move the ship up the stream as to alter the
direction of his own eyes. For Kant infers the successive
perception of different parts of the house to be neither
objective nor an event, because it depends upon his own
will. But the movement of his eyes in the direction from
roof to basement is one event, and in the direction from
basement to roof another event, just as much as the sailing
of the ship. There is no difference whatever here, nor is
there any difference either, as to their being or not being
events, between my passing a troop of soldiers and their
passing me. If we fix our eyes on a ship sailing close by
the shore on which we are standing, it soon seems as if it
were the ship that stood still and the shore that moved.
Now, in this instance we are mistaken, it is true, as to the
cause of the relative change of position, since we attribute
it to a wrong cause ; the real succession in the relative
positions of our body towards the ship is nevertheless quite
rightly and objectively recognised by us. Even Kant him
self would not have believed that there was any difference,
had he borne in mind that his own body was an object
among objects, and that the succession in his empirical
perceptions depended upon the succession of the impres
sions received from other objects by his body, and was
therefore an objective succession : that is to say, one which
takes place among objects directly (if not indirectly) and
independently of the will of the Subject, and which may
therefore be quite well recognised without any causal
connection between the objects acting successively on liis
body.