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FOTJETH CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT. 167<br />

more correctly, they are general expressions for the esta<br />

blished classes of representations which, at all times, have<br />

been more or less clearly distinguished in those cognitive<br />

faculties. But, with reference to the necessary correlate<br />

of these representations as their condition, i.e., the Sub<br />

ject, these faculties are abstracted from them (the repre<br />

sentations), and stand consequently towards the classes<br />

of representations in precisely the same relation as the<br />

Subject in general towards the Object in general. Now,<br />

just as the Object is at once posited with the Subject (for<br />

the word itself would otherwise have no meaning), and<br />

with the<br />

conversely, as the Subject is at once posited<br />

Object so that being the Subject means exactly as much<br />

as having an Object, and being an Object means the same<br />

thing as being known by the Subject so likewise, when<br />

an Object is assumed as being determined in any par<br />

ticular way, do we also assume that the Subject knows<br />

precisely in that particular way. So far therefore it is<br />

immaterial whether we say that Objects have such and<br />

such peculiar inherent determinations, or that the Subject<br />

knows in such and such ways. It is indifferent whether<br />

we say that Objects are divided into such and such classes,<br />

or that such and such different cognitive faculties are<br />

peculiar to the Subject. In that singular compound of<br />

depth and superficiality, Aristotle, are to be found traces<br />

even of insight into this truth, and indeed the critical<br />

philosophy lies in embryo in his works. He says :<br />

l<br />

/ &amp;lt;u\&amp;gt;)<br />

TO. OVTO. TTWC tan itcLVTO. (anima quammodo est uni-<br />

versa, quce sunt). And again: 6 VOVQ eari tifiog eidtiv, i.e.,<br />

the understanding is the form of forms, KO.I rj aiadrja-ic<br />

tiSog aiffdrjTwv, and sensibility the form of sensuous<br />

objects. Accordingly, it is all one whether we &quot;<br />

say, sen<br />

&quot;<br />

&quot;<br />

or, the world is<br />

sibility and understanding are no more ;<br />

1<br />

Aristot.,<br />

&quot; De anima,&quot; iii. 8.<br />

that exists.&quot; (Tr. s Add.)<br />

&quot; In a certain sense the intellect is all

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