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GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND BEST7LTS. 187
KCti arroXXviuerov, OVTUQ Se ov^iiroTE ov (ever arising and
perishing, but in fact never existing), the knowledge of
which is merely a oa per aiadi iffewg a Xoyov, and which
Christendom, with a correct instinct, calls temporal, after
that form of our principle (Time) which I have denned as
its simplest schema and the prototype of all limitation.
The general meaning of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
may, in the main, be brought back to this : that every
thing existing no matter when or where, exists ~by reason of
something else. Now, the Principle of Sufficient Eeason is
nevertheless a priori in all its forms : that is, it has its root
in our intellect, therefore it must not be applied to the
totality of existent things, the Universe, including that in
tellect in which it presents itself. For a world like this,
which presents itself in virtue of a priori forms, is just on
that account mere phenomenon ; consequently that which
holds good with reference to it as the result of these forms,
cannot be applied to the world itself, i.e. to the thing in
itself, representing itself in that world. Therefore we can
not say,
"
the world and all things in it exist by reason of
"
and this proposition is precisely the Cos-
something else ;
mological Proof.
If, by the present treatise, I have succeeded in deducing
the result just expressed, it seems to me that every specu
lative philosopher who founds a conclusion upon the Prin
ciple of Sufficient Eeason or indeed talks of a reason at all,
is bound to specify which kind of reason he means. One
of a
might suppose that wherever there was any question
reason, this would be done as a matter of course, and that
all confusion would thus be impossible. Only too often,
however, do we still find either the terms reason and cause
confounded in indiscriminate use; or do we hear basis and
what is based, condition and what is conditioned, principia
and principiata talked about in quite a general way without
any nearer determination, perhaps
because there is a secret