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302 THE WILL IN NATTJKE.
ness of the outer world reaches its acme, and in whom the
world accordingly presents itself more distinctly and com
pletely than in any other being. Still, even here, there are
innummerable degrees in the clearness of consciousness,
from the dullest blockhead to genius. Even in normal
heads there still remains a considerable tinge of subjec
tivity in their objective perception of external objects,
knowledge still bearing throughout the character of existing
merely for the ends of the will. The more eminent the
head, the less prominent is this character, and the more
purely objective does the representation of the outer world
become; till in genius finally it attains completely objec
tivity, by which the Platonic ideas detach themselves from
the individual things, because the mind which comprehends
them enhances itself to the pure subject of knowledge.
Now, as perception is the basis of all knowledge, all think
ing and all insight must be influenced by this fundamental
difference in the quality of it, from which arises that com
plete difference between the ordinary and the superior
inind in their whole way of viewing things, which may
be noticed on all occasions. From this also proceeds the
dull gravity, nearly resembling that of animals, which
characterizes common-place heads whose knowledge is
acquired solely for the benefit of the will, as opposed to
the constant play of exuberant intellect which brightens
the consciousness of the superior mind. The consideration
of the two extremes in the great scale which we have here
exhibited, seems to have given rise to the German hyper
"
"
bolical expression Slock (Klotz), as applied to human
beings, and to the English
"
blockhead."
But another different consequence of the clear separa
tion of the will from the intellect therefore of the mo
tive from the action, which first appears in the human
race, is the deceptive illusion of freedom in our individual
actions. Where, as in inorganic nature, causes, or, as in