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116 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.
able to think the rest by itself. To conceive therefore, is
to think less than we perceive. If, after considering divers
objects of perception, we drop something different belong
ing to each, yet retain what is the same in all, the result
will be the genus of that species. The generic conception
is accordingly always the conception of every species
comprised under it, after deducting all that does not
belong to every species. Now, as every possible concep
tion may be thought as a genus, a conception is always
something general, and as such, not perceptible. Every
conception has on this account also its sphere, as the sum-
total l of what may be thought under it. The higher we
ascend in abstract thought, the more we deduct, the less
therefore remains to be thought. The highest, i.e. the
most general conceptions, are the emptiest and poorest, and
at last become mere husks, such as, for instance, being,
essence, thing, becoming, &c. &c. Of what avail, by the
way, can philosophical systems be, which are only spun out
of conceptions of this sort and have for their substance
mere flimsy husks of thoughts like these ? They must of
necessity be exceedingly empty, poor, and therefore also
dreadfully tiresome.
Now as representations, thus sublimated and analysed
to form abstract conceptions, have, as we have said, forfeited
all perceptibility, they would entirely escape our conscious
ness, and be of no avail to it for the thinking processes to
which they are destined, were they not fixed and retained
in our senses by arbitrary signs. These signs are words.
In as far as they constitute the contents of dictionaries
and therefore of language, words always designate general
representations, conceptions, never perceptible objects ;
whereas a lexicon which enumerates individual things, only
contains proper names, not words, and is either a geo-
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Inbegriff.