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166 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VII.
correlate ; rather may the following beautiful passage
from the Sacred Upanishad be applied to it : Id videndum
non est : omnia videt ; et id audiendum non est : omnia
audit ; sciendum non est : omnia scit : et intelligendum non
est : omnia intelligit. Prceter id, videns, et sciens, et
audiens, et 1
intelligens ens aliud non est.
There can therefore be no knowledge of knowing, because
this would imply separation of the Subject from knowing,
while it nevertheless knew that knowing which ia im
possible.
My answer to the objection, "I not only know, but
" know also that I know," would be, Your knowing that
you know only differs in words from your knowing. I
know that I know means nothing more than I know,
and this again, unless it is further determined, means
y
nothing more than ego.
If your knowing and your
knowing that you know are two different things, just try
to separate them, and first to know without knowing that
you know, then to
knowledge being
know that you know without this
at the same time knowing." No doubt,
by leaving all special knowing out of the question, we may
at last arrive at
"
"
the proposition I know the last ab
straction we are able to make ; but this proposition is
identical with
identical with
" I
Objects exist for me," and this again is
am Subject," in which nothing more is
"
contained than in the bare word "
I."
Now, it may still be asked how the various cognitive
faculties belonging to the Subject, such as Sensibility,
Understanding, Reason, are known to us, if we do not
know the Subject. It is not through our knowing having
become an Object for us that these faculties are known to
us, for then there would not be so many conflicting judg
ments concerning them ; they are inferred rather, or
1 "
Oupnekhat," vol. i. p. 202.