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208 THE WILL IN NATURE.
For Force to fill Space, there must be Substance, Matter. A
mere force cap never fill. Matter must be there for it to
fill." Bravo ! my cobbler would use just such arguments
as these. 1 When I see specimina eruditionis of this sort, I
begin to have my misgivings whether I did not do the man
injustice by naming him among those who endeavour to
undermine Kant but in ;
this, to be sure, I had in view his
"
assertions that Space is but the relation, the juxtaposition
2
"
of and things," that Space is a relation in which things
stand, a juxtaposition of things. This juxtaposition ceases
to be a conception as soon as the conception of Matter
ceases." 3
For he might possibly have penned these sen
tences in sheer innocence, since he may have known no more
of the
"
"
Transcendental Aesthetic than of the
"
Meta
physical First Principles of Natural Science "
; though to
be sure, this would be rather extraordinary for a professor of
philosophy. Now-a-days however we must not be surprised
at anything. For all knowledge of Critical Philosophy has
died out, in spite of its being the latest true philosophy that
has appeared, and a doctrine withal, that has made a revolu
tion and epoch in human knowledge and thought. Now
therefore, since it has overthrown all previous systems, and
since the knowledge of it has died out, philosophising no
longer proceeds on the basis of any of the doctrines pro
pounded by the great minds of the past, but becomes a
mere random untutored process, having an ordinary educa
tion and the catechism for its foundation. Now that I have
startled them however, our professors may perhaps take to
studying Kant s works again. Still Lichtenberg says :
1 The same reviewer (Von Reuchlin-Meldegg) when he expounds the
doctrines of the philosophers concerning God in the August number of
the Heidelberg Annals (1855), p. 579, says: "In Kant, God is a thing
in- itself which cannot be known." lu his review of Frauenstadt s
"
"
Letters in the Heidelberg Annals of May and June (1855) he says that
there is no knowledge a priori. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
2
C. 1. p. 899.
8
p. 908.