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Download (PDF, 23.58MB) - Plurality Press

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CHAPTEE<br />

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE OLD AND OUTLINES OF A NEW<br />

DEMONSTRATION.<br />

15. Cases which are not comprised among the old estdb-<br />

lished meanings of the Principle.<br />

FEOM the summary given in the preceding chapter we<br />

gather, that two distinct applications of the principle<br />

of sufficient reason have been recognized, although very<br />

gradually, very tardily, and not without frequent relapses<br />

into error and confusion : the one being its application to<br />

judgments, which, to be true, must have a reason ; the<br />

other, its application to changes in material objects, which<br />

must always have a cause. In both cases we find the<br />

principle of sufficient reason authorizing us to ask why ? a<br />

quality which is essential to it. But are all the cases in<br />

which it authorizes us to ask why comprised in these two<br />

relations? If I ask: Why are the three sides of this<br />

triangle equal ? the answer is : Because the three angles<br />

are so. Now, is the equality of the angles the cause of the<br />

equality of the sides? No; for here we have to do with<br />

no change, consequently with no effect which must have a<br />

cause. Is it merely a logical reason ? No for the ; equality<br />

of the angle is not only a proof of the equality of the<br />

sides, it is not only the foundation of a : judgment mere<br />

conceptions alone would never suffice to explain why the<br />

sides must be equal, because the angles are so ; for the<br />

conception of the equality of the sides is not contained in<br />

that of the equality of the angles. Here therefore we

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