Download (PDF, 23.58MB) - Plurality Press

124 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.
sciousness, but rather in connecting or separating two or
more of these conceptions under sundry restrictions and
modifications which Logic indicates in the Theory of Judg
ments. A relation of this sort between conceptions dis
tinctly thought and expressed we call a judgment. Now,
with reference to these judgments, the Principle of Suffi
cient Reason here once more holds good, yet in a widely
different form from that which has been explained in the
preceding chapter ; for here it appears as the Principle of
Sufficient Reason of Knowing, prindpium rationis suf-
ficientis cognoscendi.
is to express knowledge of any kind,
As such, it asserts that if a judgment
it must have a suffi
cient reason : in virtue of which quality it then receives the
predicate true. Thus truth is the reference of a judgment
to something different from itself, called its reason or
ground, which reason, as we shall presently see, itself
admits of a considerable variety of kinds. As, however,
this reason is invariably a something upon which the
judgment rests, the German term for it, viz., Grund, is not
ill chosen. In Latin, and in all languages of Latin origin,
the word by which a reason of knowledge is designated, is
the same as that used for the faculty of Reason (ratio-
cinatio) : both are called ratio, la ragione, la razon, la raison,
the reason. From this it is evident, that attaining know
ledge of the reasons of judgments had been recognised as
Reason s highest function, its business /car ifrxfiv. Now,
these grounds upon which a judgment may rest, may be
divided into four different kinds, and the truth obtained
by that judgment will correspondingly differ. They are
stated in the following paragraph.
30. Logical Truth.
A judgment may have for its reason another judgment ;
in this case it has logical or formal truth. Whether it has