Seeing clearly: Frame Semantic, Psycholinguistic, and Cross ...

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4 I believe that linguists should be concerned with the psychological processes of language production and understanding and their underlying neurological mechanisms, and that linguistic theories should be consistent withwhatisknown in those elds. The eld of psy- cholinguistics undoubtedly has the most to contribute to linguistics proper; if nothing else, it often demonstrates the di culty of experimentally studying constructs which linguists may assumeasgiven, such as derivational complexity (Are passives really more complex than actives?), or which linguists rarely consider in detail, such as lexical access (Exactly what is retrieved from memory at what point insentence processing?). Finally, linguists should be aware of developments in computer science, particularly in areas such as knowledge representation, connectionist networks, information retrieval, and natural language processing. Although relatively few computer scientists have based their work directly upon contemporary linguistics, many have adapted some elements of linguistic theory for particular purposes, and it should be instructive for linguists to see what works and what does not in such implemented systems. Semantics and World Knowledge One of the most di cult questions in the eld of semantics is where (if anywhere) to draw the line between meanings conveyed by language and knowledge of the world in general. At one extreme, some cognitive linguists deny the possibility of delimiting linguistic semantics in any clearcut way: \The distinction between semantics and pragmatics (or between linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge) is largely artifactual, and the only viable conception of linguistic semantics is one that avoids such false dichotomies and is consequently encyclopedic in nature." (Langacker 1987:154) Langacker gives the example of the noun compound buggy whip (p. 157), which cannot be explained compositionally unless the semantics of buggy is taken to include the notions of a driver and a horse. At the other extreme, we nd statements such as \Crucially, all aspects of meaning that are situational must be removed from the study of Grammar, since they overload the Grammar with redundant material and prevent the formulation of important empirical generaliza- tions."(Bouchard 1995:16). 2 2 Situational is a tricky wordtodene. One cannot understand the concept of buggy whip without understanding what we will call the frame in which itisused,involving at least a horse, a buggy, and a driver. On the other hand, the meaning of buggy whip does not depend on whether or not one is riding on a buggy at the time of speaking the words.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5 Although Langacker and Bouchard agree to a surprising extent on the isomor- phism of semantic structures and syntactic structures, Langacker postulates a rich \semantic space" as the basis of all linguistic symbols, while Bouchard wants to nd a minimal semantics that will map onto the required syntax, and to relegate all other meaning conveyed by language to an ill-de ned pragmatic interpretation mechanism. Bierwisch &Schreuder (1989) also take what is called a \two-level" approach, sep- arating linguistic semantics from world knowledge and de ning the pragmatic, interpretive processes in somewhat more detail. But in the long run, such an approach must either deal with the hard problems of compositionality, conversational implicature, etc. or not. If these problems are dealt with, the mechanisms for doing so must ultimately be as complex as those of cognitive linguistics in any case; if they are not fully dealt with, then we willhave just another example of sweeping the hard problems under a rug and waiting for someone outside \linguistics proper" to take care of them. If linguists really are concerned with the psychological reality of the constructs of their theories, and are willing to accept psycholinguistic evidence as constraining possible linguistic theories, then it seems that the burden of proof is on those who want to postulate a separate set of mental mechanisms for lexical semantics, distinct from more general cognitive abilities. On the other hand, it is obvious that most linguistic analysis does not require the full range of world knowledge at every step. For example, deciding that a particular situation is going to be described in a sentence by a particular noun in a particular argument relation with a particular verb requires a considerable degree of what would be called \world knowledge" in some schools of linguistics. But having decided this, choosing an in ectional form of the noun, in highly in ected languages such as Latin, requires only the information as to what declension the noun belongs to, the case and number to be expressed, and some very schematic representations of the in ectional a xes for each declension. (This account is adequate for \regular" nouns; additional complexity isinvolved for \irregular" nouns, with various levels of subregularity.) Frame Semantics, Construction Grammar, and Other Formalisms In discussing semantics, I will assume, as is customary in cognitive linguistics, that language does not directly re ect facts about an \objective" external world existing independent ofhuman observers, but rather re ects the conceptual structures which people
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Chapter 3 Other Cognitive Approache
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CHAPTER 3. OTHER COGNITIVE APPROACH
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CHAPTER 6. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIO
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 239 Bierwisch, Manfred
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 241 ||, & B.T.S. Atkin
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 243 ||. 1990. The inva
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 245 Osgood, C.E. 1970.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 247 Wasow, Thomas. 198
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Appendix A Additional Corpus Exampl
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL CORPUS EXAMP
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APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF MORPHOLOGY A
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APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENT 1 257 Recogn
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Appendix D Stimuli for Experiments
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APPENDIX D. STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENTS
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Index activation, 13, 136, 137, 231
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INDEX 277 description, 82 see proce
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INDEX 279 173{178, 186, 190{192, 20
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