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Seeing clearly: Frame Semantic, Psycholinguistic, and Cross ...

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 10<br />

scale, whichwould correlate well with those of other such subjects! Armstrong et al. consider<br />

that their results call into question the whole concept of de ning categories by features, <strong>and</strong><br />

admit that \the sum of the features is not the whole concept". In fact, they conclude \. . . we<br />

ourselves are not optimistic that a general theory of categorization, one that will answer to<br />

the serious problems . . . is just around the corner. To the contrary, the continuing failure of<br />

the search for such units leads us to doubt whether there is a general psychological domain<br />

encompassing `all concepts' . . . ." (See Lako 1987 for a criticism of their views <strong>and</strong> a<br />

reinterpretation of their results).<br />

The variety <strong>and</strong> reproducibility of the fundamental experiments in this area prove<br />

that prototype e ects are, in some sense, a real fact about human categorization. However,<br />

prototype e ects vary from subject to subject, from context to context, <strong>and</strong> even from time<br />

to time for the same subject. As Barsalou (1987) concludes:<br />

The graded structures within categories do not remain stable across situations.<br />

Instead a category's graded structure can shift substantially with changes in<br />

context. This suggests that graded category structures do not re ect invariant<br />

properties of categories but instead are highly dependent on constraints inherent<br />

in speci c situations. (p. 107, quoted in Schutze 1996)<br />

Anumber of linguists have argued that linguistic categories (notably the basic<br />

syntactic categories, or parts of speech, such as noun, verb, <strong>and</strong> adjective) display prototype<br />

e ects; Lako (1987:289-92) <strong>and</strong> Taylor (1995:Ch. 10) argue that both syntactic categories<br />

<strong>and</strong> syntactic constructions display such e ects. 4<br />

Folk Models of Language <strong>and</strong> the Lexicon<br />

In Chapter 4 we will be discussing the results of psycholinguistic experiments in<br />

which subjects are asked to make decisions about the senses involved in various examples<br />

of uses of see, <strong>and</strong> in Chapter 5, we will be discussing how dictionaries divide examples<br />

into senses. It is therefore useful to consider what theories speakers typically have about<br />

lexical semantics <strong>and</strong> how this might in uence their thinking about the semantics of see<br />

<strong>and</strong> (indirectly) the way lexicographers write entries for non-specialist dictionaries.<br />

The usual folk theory of language use is based on the communication is object<br />

exchange metaphor (Sweetser 1987, also called the Conduit Metaphor (Lako & Johnson<br />

4 Langacker (1987:189-208) argues that although these syntactic categories display prototype e ects they<br />

are still crisp, because all members of each category \instantiate a single, abstract schema subject to reasonably<br />

explicit characterization."(p.189).

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