WRITING AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ... - Cornell University
WRITING AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ... - Cornell University
WRITING AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ... - Cornell University
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angle, as the rays are declined in the ‘medium.’ This is why ‘simulacrum’ may be both<br />
representation of right intention or an idol [My emphasis]. 104<br />
Wyclif argues that sovereignty—whether rightfully or wrongfully held—is a simulacrum of God.<br />
A sinner, therefore, cannot exercise dominion because he is not properly representing it, because<br />
he is outside the realm of faith and simulation altogether.<br />
Rocha, like most of the Council and like Vladimiri, took Wyclif’s position at its bare<br />
minimum: thinking of sovereignty (an idea held by God) as representative (like human speech)<br />
was to argue that divine qualities had a being dependent on human actions. This in turn meant<br />
that true sovereignty was by nature impossible for humans because, through original sin, no<br />
human could rightfully represent the being of God. If sovereignty is not an idea but an<br />
ontological representation of God’s grace, then no one could be a lord, a prelate, or a pontiff<br />
because, in respect to God, everyone is a sinner.<br />
Because he does not seem to cite Vladimiri, it may be argued that Rocha is not closely<br />
following Vladimiri’s logic. 105 However, it is hard to make sense of Rocha’s arguments without<br />
the background of Vladimiri’s Opinio and Articuli particularly when, in the manner of Vladimiri,<br />
Rocha describes the taking of infidel lands as a problem of thinking authority as purely semantic:<br />
Principaliter arguitur, quia dato, quod rex Plonorum esset talis, sicut supponitur per confectorem<br />
libelli, nichilominus ad hoc, quod licite possent insurgere contra ipsum principes christiani,<br />
exigeretur, quod esset notoria talis; alias possent principes insurgere contra quemcumque, dicendo<br />
ipsum inimicum esse fidei christiane, hereticum vel ydolatrantem, quod est absurdum.<br />
Principally it is argued, because given, that the king of the Poles would be such [an idolater] as if<br />
it is supposed through the makings of libel, as such to this he would be expelled, because licitly<br />
the Christian princes can rise against him because such a notoriety; [following this logic however]<br />
other times, the princes can rise against anyone, saying that he is an enemy of the Christian faith,<br />
heretic, or idolater, which is absurd. 106<br />
104 Elemér Boreczky, John Wyclif’s Discourse on Dominion in Community (Leiden: Brill, 2007) 184-185, note 91.<br />
105 Stanslius Belch argues that Rocha was not influenced by Vladimiri because to him “A war to death against any<br />
infidels would, therefore, be just in itself” (1.722). Belch’s argument forgets Rocha’s more profound agreement with<br />
Vladimiri that Hostiensis’s logic “savored of heresy” (Ibid).<br />
106 Acta 366.<br />
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