0 - The Black Vault

THE BDMV CORPORATION
0 war'nad that he saw nlu choice but to contitii~e on tne courxe set by
JFK when he requested supplemental appr'opriationb for Vietnami in
May of '1965,
8 announced a nev' 125-thousand troop ceiling for US foirces in RVN
in July 1965,
5 stated that adaitional US forces would be provided if needed--t..e
begi nni ngs of h is graouated mi 1-1tar., pressure,
0 remalned alert. "to explore negotiat;ed sý luýior., that [would]
attain US objectives in an icceptdble manrier."59/
The
obj,ýctivc of the Johnson adru~inistraLion was to maintair an
independent non-commun ,ist South Vi etnam, In the later years, this was
k, rephrased as "allcwing the South Vietrames.,Ž to determine their own future
without external interference. :6O/
The key decisions from 196G through 1'36E appear to have been
based on tactical considerations rather than str3teqi- ones. That -s, the
Z_ ~ pol 4cy" alter'natives considered by the d~cis~onmaKer:ý foc'ised on a'lternative
numbers of ground forces or altern~ti've bo;,aong prograirs;,O/1 The
attitud.-: and 12cisions of US policy makers seemi~d to be dominatfd ;)y the
issues of troop 1½vels, selecting bombing targets, p2c-ri~caticn efforts and
battlefield stat-stics or "mec,;ures of progress." The -. tionale fow' such
focus Probably stemmed from the idea 'that if the US demons -,rated its
resolve and inteitilon to graciuFýly increase pressure on the DRV, they would
even'lually relent and either agree to a .iegotiated settlement fir just pull
back their suppo-t of the VC and leave the South.61/
a. In-Country Confcrrancýe and Implementationi
Ambacsador Henry Cabot Lodge was reappointe'i to the Saigon
Embassy post fi Aug-ust 1965, after General Taylbr completed a. rather d 4 s,-ppointing
one year stint. The war was quickly becoming "Americanized", the
Hop Tac pacification program-- successor to the Strategic Hamlet Pr--gram--
had flopo-c'.
The Country Year., began pursuing new programs energetically.
bUt found them to be plagued by dispersion of author-*'%.\
and lack of coordi
nati on. 62/ Another s tuati on, trie pol iti cal. i nstabil1i ty of the GVN,
which had been a prime source of Frustration for in-country leaaership
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