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THE BDM CORPORATION<br />

thus releasing French forces for mobile operations. General Navarre also<br />

intended to form more light mobile battalions, and he expected reinforcements<br />

from France. With additional US arms and equipment for his forces,<br />

Navarre planned to hold the Red River Delta and Cochinchina while building<br />

up his mobile reserves. By avoiding decisive battles during the dry season<br />

from October 1953 to April 1954, Navarre hoped to assemble his mobile<br />

strike forces for an offensive that by 1955 would result in a draw at<br />

least.<br />

<strong>The</strong> military plan had a pacification counterpart that would secure<br />

the dreas under Viet Minh influence.<br />

His plans were unsuccessful, however, despite increased US<br />

shipments of arms and equipment. <strong>The</strong> French politely but firmly prevented<br />

American advisers and General O'Daniel from intervening in what they considered<br />

tneir own business.<br />

Following instructions from Paris to block the<br />

communist advance into Laos, General Navarre in November 1953 decided to<br />

occupy and defend Dien Bien Phu.<br />

This fatal decision was based on grave<br />

miscalculations, and the Viet Minh overran Dien Bien Phu on 8 May 1954.<br />

<strong>The</strong>ir tactical victory marked the end of effective French military operations<br />

in the first Indochina War, although fighting continued until 20<br />

July, the date the Geneva Accords were signed.26/<br />

After the Geneva Accords and the signing of the SEATO treaty<br />

the US moved to replace the French in South Vietnam, Ambassador Heath<br />

presented Ngo Dinh Diem, then premier, a letter from President Eisenhower<br />

wherein the president asserted the willingness of the US<br />

South Vietnamese<br />

to assist the<br />

"in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state,<br />

capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military<br />

means," but he hinged the offer upon "performance on the part of the GVN<br />

undertaking needed reforms "27/ Furthermore, the president directed thdZ<br />

American assistance would go direct to Diem's government and not through<br />

the French as before.<br />

Although several key advisers 28/<br />

to President Eisenhower<br />

felt Premier Diem should be replaced because he seemed to lack the leadership<br />

qualities needed to overcome divisive elements, Diem was able to<br />

dominate the opposing religious sects (Cao Dai and Hoa Hao), put down the<br />

in<br />

2-18

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