0 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
the Communist Pathet Lao in their 1ight to overthrow Premier Souvanna
Phouma's Royal Laotian Army and CIA-supported Meo tribesmen led by General
Vang Pao.
President Nixon approved B-52 air strikes against DRY
forces operating in northern Laos, and those coupled with successful
counteroffensives launched by Laotian forces (supported by Thai volunteers),
were enough to thwart the Noith Vietnamese attack and drive them
from the strategic plains.
military equilibrium in northern Laos was ,iai-itained,
The Laos crisis subsided for the year and the
Throughout this "war widening" period President Nixon
and Mr, Kissinger pursued a military strategy that sought to pers,'ade Hanoi
to compromise and negotiate.
wrote:
Reflecting on that period, a key official
There was no purely diplomatic alternative. Unless military
and political efforts were kept in tandem, both would prove
sterile. Until 1972 Hanoi never gave us a p.:litical option:
its negotiating position was to demand ojr unilateral withdrawal
on a short deadline and the overthrow of the Saigon
government, It did so because it believed itself to be
winning; it chose compromise only after a military stalemate
had become apparent1ll7/
3) The Cambodian Incursion
The situation in Indochina began to deteriorate drastically
in March and April of 1970, Mr., Kissinger's secret talks with Le
Duc Tho were going nowhere; there was a significant ccmmurist offensive
beginning in Laos, and the coup which had overthrown Sihanouk in Cambodia
was followed by North Vietnamese attacks throughout the country,
The first weeks in April saw numerous communist attacks
on Cambodian towns and lines of communications. Intense enemy pressure was
I
put on the capital city of Phnom Penh, whose collapse seemed imminent.
Further, the US faced the prospect of Sihan-iuk being returned to power by
L,
his newly cultivated communist benefactors. After deliberations and consultations
with Ambassado.r Bunker and General Abrims, the NSC presented
President Nixon with the following three tactical options:118/
9 doing nothing (preferred by State and DOD)
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